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Government Refuses to March-In Under Bayh-Dole—Again
The Bayh-Dole Act was in the news at the end of 2010. Three patients suffering from Fabry disease, a rare genetic condition that impairs the victim’s ability to metabolize fat and can lead to kidney failure and heart disease, petitioned the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to exercise the government’s “march-in” rights under Bayh-Dole (pdf) and compel the holder of the patent on the only FDA-approved Fabry treatment to grant licenses to other manufacturers. Just as it has in response to every previous march-in petition, the NIH refused the march-in request (pdf).
Bayh-Dole, From the Beginning. Enacted in 1980, Bayh-Dole was intended to promote the commercialization of government-funded research by allowing universities and other non-profits that receive federal grants—rather than the government itself—to own any resulting patents. This then-radical change in the law gave rise to the practice of technology transfer, whereby universities conduct sponsored research, patent the results, and then license the use of the patented inventions to spin-offs (which often involve the faculty inventors as principals) and other private companies.
Surreptitious Genetic Testing: WikiLeaks Highlights Gap in Genetic Privacy Law
The top news story the past two weeks: the release of hundreds of thousands of confidential American diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks. While dissecting diplomatic maneuvering is not a traditional area of expertise for the Genomics Law Report, a pair of cables did catch our eye.
The first is primarily a curiosity: the allegation that Chinese authorities are spying on deCode Genetics, Iceland’s most prominent genetic research company and provider of the direct-to-consumer genetic testing service, deCODEme. Nobody seems to know exactly what China is looking to gain by clandestinely exploring Iceland’s genetic genealogy. You are welcome to speculate in the comments.
The second raises broader issues: the revelation that the State Department’s ongoing human intelligence collection directives include requests for “biometric information” on key world leaders, including United Nations arms inspectors, the Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO) and key advisors and aides to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. A separate cable detailing intelligence collection priorities in Africa’s Great Lakes region clarifies that “biometric information” includes “health [data]…fingerprints, facial images, DNA, and iris scans.”
Not disclosed in the WikiLeaked cables: why the State Department wants the biometric data or whether any have been successfully obtained.
Surreptitious Testing: An Overview. The cables are, however, a reminder that the law surrounding the surreptitious collection and testing of biometric data, including DNA, remains extremely murky.
Challenging the FDA: A History Lesson for DTC Genetics
Last week the FDA sent letters to five personal genomics companies alleging that the companies are manufacturing and selling medical devices without appropriate FDA review. The FDA’s decision to substantially increase its regulatory oversight of some of the most prominent direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic service providers has met with a mixed reaction. Supporters of the move argue that these DTC products are medical in nature and require more stringent regulatory controls. Critics, including at least one of the companies receiving a letter (23andMe), fault the FDA for adopting a paternalistic stance to personal genetic information and imposing unnecessary regulatory controls.
What’s Next for DTC? In last week’s post, we outlined several possible responses available to DTC genetics companies, including (1) pulling products from market, (2) agreeing to comply with FDA regulatory requirements, (3) modifying products to avoid FDA oversight or (4) challenging the FDA’s regulatory authority over DTC genetic testing products. We also noted the possibility that the FDA’s decision to look more closely at DTC genetic tests could presage increased scrutiny of the genetic testing industry more broadly, including the many tests currently offered without FDA clearance or approval as laboratory developed tests (LDTs).
In Support of Open Access for Genomic Research
This commentary in the Genomics Law Report’s ongoing series What ELSI is New? is contributed by George Church, Harvard Medical School.
One of the recurring themes in this ELSI series has been the discussion of open-access vs. research-only models for genomic research (see Bobe, MacArthur, McCarty, Prainsack and Sweeney). Below I discuss the characteristics and advantages of, as well as obstacles to, an open-access data model for genomic research.
A. Self-access: Open-access and freedom of information are increasingly required by law. Medical research is increasingly holistic — integrating a variety of (identifiable) traits and molecular signatures. Genomics is just part of this, not particularly exceptional. Multi-purpose cohorts and biobanks are displacing single trait studies. Research volunteers are increasingly expecting to see their own data and what is being doing with it. So with respect to such desired transparency, projects can be classified as ranging from 1) “no access” (HapMap, 1000 Genomes, dbGAP), to 2) limited access and no vetting exam (ClinSeq, CPMC and REVEAL), to 3) full access based on obtaining a 100% score on an exam covering risks of data sharing and re-identification (PGP).
