Informed Consent
Surreptitious Genetic Testing: A New Bill in Texas and the Iowa Straw Poll
Although the United States will not conduct its next presidential election for another fifteen months, the race for the White House begins in earnest tomorrow in Iowa with the Ames Straw Poll. As the coverage of straw polls, campaign ads and political positioning shifts into high gear, it may not be a coincidence that the issue of surreptitious genetic testing is also back in the news.
The legal and ethical uncertainty surrounding surreptitious genetic testing—which can be broadly defined as any genetic test performed without the knowledge and/or consent of the individual tested—first piqued the public′s interest shortly after the 2008 election thanks to an editorial by Bob Green and George Annas in The New England Journal of Medicine. Green and Annas worried that “persons or groups opposing a candidate [and] hoping to harm his or her chances for election” would obtain and release genetic information without consent, a form of “genetic McCarthyism.” This would not be very difficult, the authors concluded, since “sufficient DNA for amplification and analysis can be obtained from loose hairs, coffee cups, discarded utensils, or even a handshake.”
Nearly three years later, surreptitious genetic testing is back in the news thanks in large part to an in-depth article by Eriq Gardner in the current issue of the ABA Journal. Gardner′s piece examines the practice of surreptitious genetic testing, provides a compelling anecdote from a confessed “DNA thief” and highlights many of the privacy concerns associated with the practice.
Genetic Bill of Rights Proposed in Massachusetts
On January 21, 2011, the Massachusetts Genetic Bill of Rights (MA GBR) (pdf) was introduced before the Massachusetts state legislature. At its core, the proposed legislation establishes property and privacy rights for genetic information and genetic material, while providing protections designed to shield individuals from genetic profiling and other misuses of genetic information.
Taken as a whole, the legislation, if enacted, would confer upon Massachusetts residents a significantly expanded set of genetic rights than exist under current federal law. Below we examine several of the bill’s most noteworthy proposals.
The MA GBR addresses perceived gaps and limitations in the coverage provided by major federal statutes, including the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, by seeking to place genetic information on a par with medical records.
The MA GBR’s provisions set basic limitations on the use, including the commercial use, of personal genetic information that would go above and beyond the user agreements and privacy policies employed by some commercial services. For example, the MA GBR prohibits the use of genetic information for marketing or determining credit worthiness. With the proliferation of genetic information, particularly in consumer or commercial contexts, such basic limitations would help address concerns about the lack of mandatory restrictions regarding the sale, transfer or other use of personal genetic data.
The Personal Property Theory of Personal Genomes. But the MA GBR goes much further than mere consumer protection reforms. Section 1 of the proposed legislation explicitly declares genetic information to be “the exclusive property of the individual from whom the information is obtained.” (emphasis added)
Surreptitious Genetic Testing: WikiLeaks Highlights Gap in Genetic Privacy Law
The top news story the past two weeks: the release of hundreds of thousands of confidential American diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks. While dissecting diplomatic maneuvering is not a traditional area of expertise for the Genomics Law Report, a pair of cables did catch our eye.
The first is primarily a curiosity: the allegation that Chinese authorities are spying on deCode Genetics, Iceland’s most prominent genetic research company and provider of the direct-to-consumer genetic testing service, deCODEme. Nobody seems to know exactly what China is looking to gain by clandestinely exploring Iceland’s genetic genealogy. You are welcome to speculate in the comments.
The second raises broader issues: the revelation that the State Department’s ongoing human intelligence collection directives include requests for “biometric information” on key world leaders, including United Nations arms inspectors, the Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO) and key advisors and aides to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. A separate cable detailing intelligence collection priorities in Africa’s Great Lakes region clarifies that “biometric information” includes “health [data]…fingerprints, facial images, DNA, and iris scans.”
Not disclosed in the WikiLeaked cables: why the State Department wants the biometric data or whether any have been successfully obtained.
Surreptitious Testing: An Overview. The cables are, however, a reminder that the law surrounding the surreptitious collection and testing of biometric data, including DNA, remains extremely murky.
Getting Serious About Personal Genomics’ Risks
After several months of public drama, the University of California, Berkeley’s ambitious program to introduce its incoming freshmen to personalized medicine reached its denouement in late August.
As part of its program, Berkeley offered students the option to participate in genetic testing for three common genetic variants relevant to the body’s ability to metabolize milk products, alcohol and folic acid. The University’s original plan was to allow students to elect to receive the results of their tests as part of the program. Two weeks ago, however, the California Department of Public Health (CDPH) ruled that if Berkeley wanted to return personalized genetic data to some of its freshmen, the testing must be conducted at the direction of a physician and performed by a licensed clinical laboratory. The significant logistical burden and cost of complying with the CDPH’s ruling forced Berkeley to modify its program. While some aspects of the program will go forward, no student will be able to access any personalized genetic information.
The Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act Returns to Congress
Meggan Bushee is a student at the Wake Forest University School of Law.
This past May, Congressman Patrick Kennedy (D-RI) and Congresswoman Anna Eshoo (D-CA) re-introduced a personalized medicine bill to the U.S. House of Representatives. The bill was originally introduced in 2006 by then-Senator from Illinois Barack Obama. While HR 5440, also known as the Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act of 2010 (GPMA 2010), has retained the name of the bill originally introduced by Senator Obama, its approach to the regulation of personalized medicine has taken a new direction.
GPMA 2010 is the fourth version of the GPMA since the original bill of 2006, and includes the most ambitious initiatives of all of its predecessors. Why has the GPMA re-surfaced after three prior versions failed to make it out of committee? According to Representative Kennedy, the bill has been re-introduced in response to increased public awareness and use of genomic tests. At present, GPMA 2010 is before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. This is the same committee that recently conducted high-profile hearings to review the current state of the direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing registry.
The Havasupai Indians and the Challenge of Informed Consent for Genomic Research
Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Amy Harmon, of The New York Times, reports that a long-running dispute between Arizona State University (ASU) and the Havasupai Indians over the allegedly improper research use of DNA from members of the tribe has been settled.
The research began two decades ago, ostensibly to search for a genetic variant that might be contributing to the increasing rate of diabetes in the tribe. The diabetes research proved unfruitful, but the blood donated by the Havasupai tribe members, and the DNA extracted from it, led to a number of follow-on research projects, grants and publications. It was that research – including searching tribe members’ DNA for variants linked to schizophrenia, and inferring the likely ancestral origins of the tribe’s founders – that led to lawsuits, millions in legal fees and, ultimately, the settlement.
Implications of the Havasupai Settlement. Harmon’s article provides a concise background to the dispute, and briefly describes the $700,000 settlement between ASU and the tribe to “remedy the wrong that was done.” Harmon and unnamed “legal experts” suggest that the settlement is significant because “it implied that the rights of research subjects can be violated when they are not fully informed about how their DNA might be used.”
In some respects, this is a trivial conclusion. One of the most important and well-known elements of the Common Rule – the regulatory regime that governs federally-funded human subjects research – is that researchers must seek, and participants provide, informed consent. Participants that are uninformed cannot provide valid consent and, thus, their rights as subjects are violated. In that respect, at least, the Havasupai case tells us nothing new. (I have not seen the settlement, but I doubt that it will (a) be made public or (b) contain an express admission of guilt from ASU, both factors that will limit its relevance to future similar scenarios.)
Genomic Privacy and Re-Identification Redux
New research published this week in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences from Loukides et al. offers up a new method for preserving individual privacy while linking genomic and healthcare data. (“Anonymization of electronic medical records for validating genome-wide association studies.”) Daniel Cressey of Nature News and Katharine Gammon of Technology Review have concise (and free) summaries.
As we’ve written earlier (“Back to the Future: NIH to Revisit Genomic Data-Sharing Policy”), the ability to link – and to share – genotype and phenotype data (including medical records, particularly treatment and outcome data) will be essential to the development of the next generation of genomic research. One of the most common ways to link genotype and phenotype data is to combine genomic data with electronic medical records (EMRs). A particular patient’s EMR may contain everything from basic biographical information to family medical history to current diagnoses, including ICD codes. When it comes to associating genes with medical conditions, researchers rely on International Classification of Disease (ICD) codes to categorize individual patients by disease type and search for shared genetic variations that might play a causal role.
Cracking the Codes. Obviously identifying information (e.g., biographical information) is generally required to be removed pursuant to HIPAA regulations. ICD codes, however, are sometimes retained for purposes of genetic association research and, in some circumstances, a set of otherwise anonymous ICD codes pulled from an EMR can be traced backwards to identify the specific individual supplying the codes.
The Texas Newborn Bloodspot Saga has Reached a Sad – and Preventable – Conclusion
Contributed by Ann Waldo, Senior Counsel at Genetic Alliance.
In late February, the state of Texas incinerated 5.3 million newborn bloodspots.
The background – the Genomics Law Report has had several posts (here and here) about the ongoing situation involving 5.3 million newborn bloodspots in a state biorepository in Texas. Often referred to as “residual” bloodspots, these are the tiny dried bloodspots left over after states conduct mandatory screening for specified diseases. State practices regarding retention of the residual bloodspots vary widely, with some destroying them promptly and others storing them indefinitely. Where post-screening use of the bloodspots occurs, the most common use is for quality assurance and quality control of the screening tests. Some states also permit the release of small sets of bloodspots for research.
Any such research must be done in compliance with the federal Common Rule applicable to clinical research and HIPAA, the federal medical privacy law. To simplify these laws’ complex requirements – what researchers must do depends on whether the samples or information will be made available in an identifiable or de-identified form. If a researcher receives identifiable information, then informed consents, privacy authorizations, and Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviews are mandatory. If the researcher receives only de-identified samples or information, no parental consent or privacy authorizations are required, although some states, including Texas, still insist on IRB review.
The Texas Newborn Blood Spot Saga Continues
Contributed by Allison Williams Dobson of the Center for Genomics and Society at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
The Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS) could soon face a new federal lawsuit in light of the discovery that it sent 800 anonymous newborn blood samples to a U.S. military DNA lab in 2003 and 2007. As discussed in a post by Adam Doerr on February 2, Texas Civil Rights Project lawyer Jim Harrington successfully negotiated a settlement in 2009 to have DSHS destroy 5.3 million newborn blood samples because it did not obtain informed consent from parents to use the samples for research. Now DSHS has come under criticism over samples it had already released for approved research.
The Texas Tribune reported last Monday under the headline “DNA Deception” that its review of nine years’ worth of e-mails and internal documents, obtained under state sunshine laws,1 revealed a DSHS agreement to help the military build a national mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) database. The Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory claims a legitimate research purpose for the newborn DNA samples—to improve the identification of missing person remains through analyses of highly stable mtDNA.2 Because mtDNA generally lasts longer in a wider variety of tissues than nuclear DNA, it is also more likely to be recovered from particularly old or decayed remains.
GLR Update: Australia Tackles Disclosure of Genetic Information without Consent
Last fall, the Genomics Law Report reviewed new medical confidentiality guidance from the U.K. General Medical Council (GMC) and wondered whether the “public interest” was a sufficient justification for the disclosure of patients’ genetic information without their consent.
Since that time, Australia’s National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) has tackled the same issue, publishing new privacy guidelines for health practitioners on the disclosure of genetic information (pdf).
In each case, the basic thrust of the guidance for medical practitioners is the same – there are certain circumstances where a patient’s genetic information may be disclosed against his or her wishes. However, the guidance from the GMC and the NHMRC does differ in several important respects.
First, while the GMC’s guidance applies to all doctors in the United Kingdom, the NHMRC’s guidance is restricted to Australian doctors in private practice. The NHMRC’s guidance also restricts its applicability to the disclosure of genetic information to living genetic relatives for medical purposes. Disclosures relating to unborn children (e.g., information related to embryos or carrier status), to legal but non-genetic relatives (e.g., adopted children or spouses) or for genetic research are all outside of the scope of the NHMRC’s guidelines. The GMC’s guidelines, on the other hand, contain no such specific limitations, referring only to the practitioner’s responsibility to balance the patient’s interests against those of others, and to disclose genetic or other information when justified in the public interest.
