Pending Litigation
Classen: Has the Federal Circuit Lost Interest in Patentable Subject Matter?
Allison Williams Dobson is an attorney, scientist and lecturer in the Norfolk, Virginia area and is a regular GLR contributor.
But First: The Federal Circuit Has Denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Rehearing in Myriad: This week, the Federal Circuit issued a one-word order—“Denied”—turning down both parties’ requests for rehearing by the three-judge panel that decided that case originally. The parties now have 90 days to file a certiorari petition asking for Supreme Court review.
This news is not surprising considering the Federal Circuit’s most recent treatment of patent-eligible subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act. On August 31, 2011, another 2-1 divided panel issued its opinion (three very strong opinions, really) in Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v Biogen Idec (pdf).
The majority finds that two of the three method patents in dispute claim subject matter that is patent-eligible under § 101. However, the court also emphasizes repeatedly that the two patents “may not” meet the other requirements for patentability imposed by §§ 102 (novelty), 103 (nonobviousness), and/or 112 (adequate written description). The thrust of the majority’s message is becoming a familiar mantra–the statutory role of § 101 is to act as a “coarse eligibility filter”–a gateway to the real tests–and not the “final arbiter of patentability.”
ACLU and Myriad Both Seek Further Federal Circuit Review
As we suspected they might, the plaintiffs in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics have filed a petition (pdf) seeking a rehearing of the recent federal Circuit decision. More surprisingly, Myriad has also, though its petition (pdf) is very narrowly focused.
The Plaintiffs’ Petition. Two things are interesting about the plaintiffs’ petition from a procedural standpoint. First, the ACLU lawyers requested rehearing by the three-judge panel that decided the case earlier this summer, not en banc rehearing by all members of the court. (But a majority of the judges of the full court could still decide to rehear the case en banc; they could do so if they found that the case “involves a question of exceptional importance.”) Second, the plaintiffs have asked for rehearing on only two of the issues they lost: that isolated genes are proper subject matter for product patents, and that only one of the named plaintiffs—Dr. Harry Ostrer, formerly of NYU—has standing to bring the case. The plaintiffs did not challenge that portion of the panel’s decision that upheld—unanimously—Myriad’s patents on a method of screening potential cancer therapeutics.
Pigs Return to Earth: Federal Circuit Reinstates Most—But Not All—of Myriad’s Patents
The Federal Circuit’s long-awaited decision (pdf) in Association for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (the Myriad gene patent litigation) was issued this past Friday. As we were writing, with the economy having slowed to a barely perceptible crawl and a government default looming more likely by the hour, there were plenty of reasons to believe that the sky was falling. But the Myriad decision was not, and is not, one of them.
For the most part, the Federal Circuit’s 2-1 decision returned the law to the state it was in before District Judge Sweet’s opinion turned things upside-down last March. Although full of interesting rhetoric, the court’s three lengthy opinions (a total of 105 pages) are less remarkable for what they decide than for what they invite higher authorities—the Supreme Court and the Congress—to decide down the road.
First, the scorecard. The court’s judgment—that is, the holding, or outcome—was joined by Judges Lourie and Moore. A third member of the panel, Judge Bryson, dissented in part, meaning that he joined only a portion of the judgment (more on that below) and disagreed with another part.
Don’t Forget About State Law: Michigan Decision Reminds Health Care Providers of HIPAA Preemption Issue
Phillip C. Ross is a summer associate at Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A. and a rising third-year student at Wake Forest University School of Law.
Many health care providers and other individuals and entities who deal with sensitive patient information may assume that if they comply with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), they need not worry further about the proper use or disclosure of patient data. However, a recent Michigan Court of Appeals decision served as a reminder to those individuals and entities that they must not only ensure compliance with HIPAA, but also any state laws that are more demanding than HIPAA.
HIPAA establishes regulations for the use and disclosure of Protected Health Information (“PHI”) held by “covered entities” (pdf) and “business associates.” PHI is any information held by a covered entity related to health status, provision of health care, or payment for health care that can be linked to an individual.
In Isidore Steiner, DPM, PC v. Marc Bonanni, No. 294016 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2011), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that HIPAA acts as a federal “floor” in establishing standards for the privacy of patients’ PHI. Although Bonanni was decided under Michigan law—and thus is not binding on other states—the decision is likely to be consistent among courts in other states.
News Roundup: Patent Reform Passes House, Human Provenance Project Pulled by UK
With so many developments at the intersection of genomics and the law, there is often a variety of interesting stories that, for one reason or another, don’t find their way into a full-length posting on the Genomics Law Report. In this post we recap several recent key developments and, at bottom, round up all of the recent tweets from @genomicslawyer.
Patent Reform Legislation Passes House. Several months after the U.S. Senate passed patent reform legislation that would make sweeping changes to America’ patent system, including a switch from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file system for awarding patents, the U.S. House of Representatives finally followed suit yesterday, passing a similar piece of legislation by a vote of 304-117. The version passed by the House, while similar to that passed by the Senate, contained a number of last-minute amendments (pdf).
One change of particular relevance to the personalized medicine community was the removal of a proposed safe harbor for second opinion genetic diagnostic testing, which was replaced by a requirement that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) investigate the relationship between genetic diagnostic tests, gene patents and exclusive licenses. The USPTO would be given nine months to complete its investigation and to return to Congress recommendations for ensuring the availability of second opinion genetic diagnostic testing. (The USPTO study on genetic diagnostic testing was not included in the bill passed by the Senate in March.)
Prometheus Returns to the Supreme Court, Medical Method Patent Speculation Intensifies
While everyone has been busy speculating about whether the Supreme Court will ultimately take the Myriad case, the justices (at least four of them—see below) sprung a surprise this week by deciding to review the Federal Circuit’s decision in another biomedical patent case, Prometheus v. Mayo.
The patents at issue in Prometheus involve a method of administering a drug (specifically thiopurine drugs used to treat gastrointestinal and other autoimmune diseases), measuring the drug’s level in a patient’s body, and then adjusting the dosage of the drug. The Supreme Court will hear the case this fall and should (see below) issue a ruling by next summer, thus drawing to a close a legal journey that began more than three years ago in a California district court.
Patent Update: Looking Beyond Section 101 and the Continued Murkiness of Method Patents
As the biotechnology community awaits the Federal Circuit’s decision in the Myriad Genetics patent litigation, attention has focused on the fundamental issue in that case: whether genes and methods for interpreting mutations are patentable subject matter under section 101 of the Patent Act—that is, whether they are the kinds of things that can be patented assuming that all of the other requirements of the Patent Act (pdf) are satisfied.
However, we have argued in several articles (see, e.g., here, here and here) that the real action is more likely to involve all of those “other requirements” as courts explore other ways to limit the patentability of scientific and technology progress without altering the threshold test of patentability under section 101.
A recent Federal Circuit case (Billups-Rothenberg, Inc. v. Associated Regional and University Pathologists, Inc.) decided under the written description requirement of section 112 illustrates this point yet again.
Billups v. ARUP Background. The Billups case involves a disorder called Type I hereditary hemochromatosis, which is characterized by excessive absorption of iron. The critical gene in the absorption process is called HFE, or “High Fe.” In 1994, Billups filed the application that led to a patent on methods for testing for hemochromatosis (U.S. patent number 5,674,681; “’681”). The court’s opinion reproduces this claim as “representative”:
Fabry Patients Ask for Rehearing of NIH March-in Petition
Back in December, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) refused to exercise the government’s “march-in” rights under the Bayh-Dole Act with respect to the patent-protected drug Fabrazyme® (agalsidase beta). A group of Fabry disease patients had petitioned NIH to grant licenses to other prospective producers of the enzyme replacement therapy because manufacturing problems at Genzyme, the exclusive licensee of patents held by Mount Sinai School of Medicine, had created severe supply problems.
When NIH refused to act, a larger group filed a class action lawsuit (pdf) in Pennsylvania federal court against Genzyme and Mt. Sinai for damages allegedly caused by their inability to get prescribed dosages of Fabrazyme®. As we reported last month, the suit raises novel legal theories and faces an uncertain future. (Earlier this month Genzyme filed a motion to dismiss (pdf) the lawsuit.)
What We Learned From The Myriad Oral Argument
Yesterday brought the long-anticipated oral argument in the Myriad gene patent litigation. After much speculation, the final panel consisted of Judges Lourie, Bryson and Moore. Following the Myriad argument, Judge Lourie was replaced on the panel for the remainder of the day’s cases by Judge O’Malley, lending support to speculation that Judge O’Malley recused herself from the Myriad argument because her lawyer-spouse filed an amicus brief in the case.
What We Learned from the Myriad Oral Argument. For all of the attention focused on the Myriad oral argument, most spectators have only one very practical question: did Monday’s argument provided any meaningful clues with respect to how the Federal Circuit might rule on appeal of the lower court’s startling ruling?
In a word: no. In a few more: we learned nothing from the Myriad argument that leaves us better able to predict how the Federal Circuit will rule in this case.
A Spectator’s Guide to the Myriad Oral Argument
On Monday at 10 a.m., the lawyers for both sides will argue the Myriad case (Association for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO) before a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Washington. Here are a few things about oral argument in general, and this case in particular, that interested observers may want to keep in mind.
Who’s on the Panel? Federal cases on appeal are almost always heard initially by a panel of three randomly selected judges. (In rare cases all the judges of a circuit will rehear the case together, or en banc—no way to predict if that will eventually happen here.) The Federal Circuit will announce the panel for this case on Monday morning on its website. As of now, all we know is that Myriad—and only Myriad—will be heard by “Panel B+.” The + means that the makeup of that panel will be different from that of Panel B, which will hear the three other cases also scheduled for this 10 a.m. session (a panel customarily hears four arguments in a session). The + designation sometimes means that one member of the regular panel (here, B) has recused (disqualified) him or herself from the case because of some conflict, necessitating a replacement.
