This will, I believe, mark direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing’s formal debut at ASCO. It should also serve as another reminder that, despite its relatively small numbers (both in terms of dollars and customers), DTC genetic testing continues to exert an outsized influence when it comes to conversations about the future of genomic medicine. This is particularly true when the discussion turns to appropriate policy and regulatory oversight.

In advance of ASCO, here are several items of interest from the past few weeks in DTC genetic testing.

“Trial by Press Release.” That’s exactly what Daniel MacArthur of Genetic Future termed this week’s press release from the European Society of Human Genetics (ESHG) highlighting two presentations on DTC genetic testing at the recent ESHG annual meeting.

The studies themselves have yet to be published, but preliminary findings were meant to provide new evidence that (a) the risk prediction models employed by personal genomics companies are neither perfect nor consistent and (b) clinical geneticists are skeptical of the value of DTC genetic tests.

Neither finding is surprising, although, as MacArthur points out, the first study – from Rachel Kalf of Erasmus University – will need to be published in full before its claims, including the claim that one DTC company (deCODEme) utilizes fundamentally flawed risk prediction models, can be fully vetted.

The desire to encourage greater transparency and consistency among the risk prediction models employed by DTC genetic testing companies has been expressed numerous times in the past (higher-profile examples include current NIH Director Francis Collins, genomic pioneer Craig Venter and colleagues and last summer’s GAO report) and repeatedly embraced by DTC companies themselves (see, e.g., here and here).

When it comes to debating the future of the DTC genetic testing industry there are plenty of areas of legitimate disagreement. For example, should different types of DTC tests (e.g., carrier screening vs. pharmacogenomic testing vs. genetic ancestry testing) which make different types of claims be regulated differently? And how, if at all, should the concept of utility, whether clinical or personal, be incorporated into a genetic test evaluation?

But the need to improve transparency and consistency in DTC risk prediction models already appears to be shared nearly universally among DTC stakeholders.

The second study included in the ESHG release, conducted by Heidi Howard of the University of Leuven, Belgium, includes the finding that 63% of a “representative sample of clinical geneticists” from across Europe “wanted to proscribe whole genome scans carried out by DTC companies.”

That statistic has bounced around the internet echo chamber the past few days, but, again, is it offering us anything we did not already know (or at least strongly suspect)? As MacArthur points out, asking the current cohort of genetic testing gatekeepers how they feel about being sidestepped by genetic testing companies seeking to engage directly with individuals feels slightly rhetorical:

While it is important that personal genomics companies consult with medical professionals in devising their risk prediction algorithms and interfaces, regulation of genetic testing should not be based on the views of the traditional gatekeepers of genetic information.

As both MacArthur and Razib Khan of Gene Expression note, the appropriate question to ask is not whether clinicians believe genetic tests are harmful in the hands of consumers, but whether genetic tests are actually harmful in the hands of consumers.

Thankfully, a growing list of researchers is asking that very question, including Bloss et al. (see also a recent back-and-forth in the NEJM), Kauffman et al. and the recently launched Impact of Personal Genomic Services (IPeG) study (some details here), about which my co-presenter Stacy Gray will be providing more details during today’s panel.

As the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and others continue to wrestle with the difficult job of shaping DTC regulatory policy, the data generated by these and other studies will be critical in ensuring that any policy which eventually emerges responds to the demonstrated challenges of DTC genetic testing, and not merely to hypothesized harms.

The FDA Sends Three More DTC Letters. Speaking of the FDA, nearly a year to the day after it sent its first letter of concern to a DTC genetic testing company (Pathway Genomics), the agency sent out its latest batch of DTC letters. The recipients this time: Lumigenix, American International Biotechnology Services and Precision Quality DNA.

Much has transpired since that first FDA letter – including many more DTC letters, a Congressional hearing last summer and a closely watched advisory panel meeting earlier this spring – but for now, at least in public, the FDA is continuing to employ the same case-by-case approach to DTC genetic testing oversight it has utilized from the outset.

Not everyone is happy with the FDA’s current approach. One of the most recent companies to receive a letter, Precision Quality DNA, has devoted a section of its company website to the FDA’s handling of DTC regulation, and has published its strongly worded reply to the agency’s most recent letter.

While it would be inaccurate to characterize Precision Quality DNA’s response as representative of the views held throughout the DTC industry, several of the points the company raises – including the need for greater transparency surrounding the FDA’s review and oversight of DTC genetic testing products – seem likely to resonate with other companies, whether they are currently in dialogue with the FDA or anxiously awaiting their own letter from the agency. (A good bet for a future FDA letter: companies offering direct-to-consumer telomere measurement tests, several of which drew criticism in recent weeks for over-inflating the ability of telomere length to predict individual longevity.)

The Latest in DTC Offerings. American International Biotechnology Services (AIBioTech), another company to receive a recent DTC letter from the FDA, found itself under the FDA’s microscope thanks to its Sports X Factor Genetic Athletic Assessment Test. The test purports to “reveal a person’s genetic athletic performance indicators as well as the potential for several risk factors,” including the risk of “negative results after an injury to an individual, such as a concussion,” or the possibility of an “undiagnosed heart condition.”

AIBioTech is not the first company to attempt to combine genetic testing and athletics – we dissected offerings from Athleticode and Atlas Sports Genetics back in 2009 – but the company’s test has received additional scrutiny due to its inclusion of markers for the apolipoprotein E (APOE) gene. The APOE gene, which comes in at least three different versions or alleles (ε2, ε3 and ε4), has been shown to affect an individual’s risk of coronary heart disease, as well as for developing late-onset Alzheimer’s disease.

Providing APOE results directly to consumers raises a host of delicate ethical and legal issues, as we discussed last month when DTC veteran 23andMe unveiled APOE reporting as part of its standard service. AIBioTech has drawn criticism for largely ignoring these issues in offering its athletics-focused test. (This in addition to criticism of the scientific validity of the claims offered up by AIBioTech and other athletic genetic testing companies.)

The inclusion of APOE in the AIBioTech test also highlights one of the frequently discussed challenges of trying to regulate any genetic test – whether DTC or otherwise – on the basis of its claims or intended use. As the proliferation of genomic data continues and our collective genomic understanding grows, the number of genetic markers which exert influence upon multiple traits of varying significance is likely to rise.

APOE’s implication in both heart disease and Alzheimer’s is a classic illustration of the phenomenon of pleiotropy – the ability of a single gene to influence multiple phenotypic traits – although it is hardly the only pleiotropic gene (genes responsible for sickle-cell disease, PKU and albinism, among others, also exert pleiotropic effects). As additional pleiotropic biomarkers are identified, the notion that genetic tests should be evaluated based on their intended use is likely to come under increasing pressure. How, for instance, will regulators address a genetic ancestry test when one or more of the biomarkers employed by the test could be used to predict an individual’s genetic risk for a serious disease? While this dilemma is not a conceptually new one, as the regulatory framework for genetic testing evolves, the nonlinearity of gene-trait relationships seems likely to pose a significant challenge for regulators, clinicians and companies who would prefer the ability to provide precisely targeted genetic test results to individuals.

Regardless, the issue seems likely to be mooted in large part at the point in the not-too-distant future where individuals have routine and early access to complete whole-genome sequences. Then the issue will no longer be whether or how to provide data with the potential to help predict multiple phenotypic effects, but how to exert any control whatsoever on the interpretative tools available (including, perhaps, IBM’s Dr. Watson, which is now reportedly “as good as the smartest second year med student”) to individuals who have access to complete and portable personal genomic data.

Are You Ready for RUO? Finally, one very recent development of potential significance to the DTC industry is the applicability of the just-released FDA draft guidance for research-use-only (RUO) and investigational-use-only (IUO) in vitro diagnostic products.

Published earlier this week, the RUO/IUO guidance clarifies the rules for marketing and commercializing diagnostic products under the widely used RUO and IUO exemptions, which allow device manufacturers to avoid submitting their products under the FDA’s rigorous medical device approval pathway. (For more see this article in Pharmacogenomics Reporter.)

The draft guidance, which is open for public comment for the next 90 days, is a significant event for manufacturers of laboratory developed tests (LDTs), many of which are thought to incorporate RUO/IUO components despite being offered for clinical or diagnostic purposes. Expect LDT manufacturers and industry groups, such as the Association of Molecular Pathology and American Clinical Laboratory Association, to have plenty to say on the RUO/IUO draft guidance before the comment period expires at the end of the summer.

Less clear is what impact the RUO/IUO guidance might have on the DTC industry. As with LDTs, it is not known exactly how many DTC genetic test providers utilize RUO/IUO components in their products. However, the pairing of an RUO or IUO device with a DTC product certainly occurs. For instance, 23andMe utilizes the Illumina OmniExpress Plus in its popular DTC service. The OmniExpress is part of a family of popular DNA microarray products offered by Illumina and labeled for research use only (pdf).

This exact issue appeared last summer when the FDA included Illumina in its first batch of DTC letters following the Pathway/Walgreens dust-up. From our coverage last June:

Of all the companies receiving letters, Illumina is the only one not to offer at least one product directly to consumers (the company does offer a commercial whole-genome sequencing service, although that product requires the participation of a healthcare professional). Illumina’s letter notes that the company has “received FDA clearance or approval for several of its devices,” but not for the HumanHap550 array. “Yet Illumina is knowingly providing the HumanHap550 array to 23andMe and deCODE Genetics for clinical diagnostic use without FDA clearance or approval” despite its being labeled “For Research Use Only.” As Gutierrez notes, “…Illumina has to follow the law, and they are aware that the chips are not being used for research only.”

Although the specific product has changed over the past year, the fundamental issue has not. The new RUO/IUO guidance, if approved in its current form, places a heavier burden on providers of RUO/IUO devices to “not sell such products to laboratories they know use the product for clinical diagnostic use.”

Which brings us back to one of the fundamental tensions concerning DTC genetic testing services: whether such services are intended, at least in the eyes of the FDA, for clinical diagnostic use. While the FDA and DTC genetic testing companies may not agree on the reasonably intended uses of these services, the FDA’s draft RUO/IUO guidance threatens to insert another key player – platform technology providers, like Illumina – squarely into the middle of the DTC debate.

If the FDA continues to maintain that the genetic testing services offered by 23andMe, Lumigenix and other DTC providers are intended for use in clinical and/or diagnostic testing, the Illuminas of the world will find themselves with a difficult choice to make. They will likely be forced to (a) defy the FDA’s RUO/IUO guidance, (b) stop selling their RUO/IUO devices to DTC companies or (c) attempt to shepherd their RUO/IUO devices through the FDA’s resource-intensive medical device approval process.

Or as the FDA puts it:

FDA is aware that laboratories sometimes use IVD products labeled RUO in clinical diagnosis and that many manufacturers, importers, and distributors of IVD products labeled RUO are also aware of such use. Manufacturers who label their IVD products: “For Research Use Only. Not for use in diagnostic procedures,” should not sell such products to laboratories that they know use the product for clinical diagnostic use. If a manufacturer learns that a laboratory to which it sells its RUO-labeled IVD product is using it in clinical diagnosis, it should halt such sales or comply with FDA requirements for IVD products, including premarket review requirements, if applicable.

If it were only DTC companies utilizing RUO/IUO devices, manufacturers like Illumina might simply stop selling those devices in light of the small (current) size of the DTC industry. But because those same devices also appear to be used by a number of LDT manufacturers, who represent a much larger market, there is a strong possibility that RUO/IUO device suppliers like Illumina will seek to obtain FDA approval for those devices, hopefully while working with the FDA to keep those devices on the market in the interim to avoid interruptions to patient care (or, in the case of their DTC customers, consumer product supply).

Regardless, the next few months will bear close watching to see whether the FDA’s attempt to more strictly enforce RUO/IUO labeling results in any significant shift in the relationships between DTC genetic testing companies and their technology suppliers.

What’s Next for DTC? Remember that it was roughly this time last year when Pathway Genomics’ failed partnership with Walgreens kicked off a busy summer of DTC (and related) activities at the FDA and on Capitol Hill. Up until this week, Washington had been relatively quiet since the end of last summer, at least in public. While the RUO/IUO situation bears watching, there are some who expect this summer to bring further fireworks on a par with last year.

While several important initiatives continue to loom as possibilities – including the FDA’s long-anticipated LDT guidance and new diagnostic-focused legislation from Congress – with 2011 nearly halfway gone I continue to think that the prospects for industry-wide regulation of DTC genetic testing in 2011 remain dim.

(1) presymptomatic and (2) mildly symptomatic but pre-dementia, along with (3) dementia caused by Alzheimer’s. This reflects current thinking that Alzheimer’s begins creating distinct and measurable changes in the brains of affected people years, perhaps decades, before memory and thinking symptoms are noticeable.

At least for the moment, the new guidelines are intended to be used only with patients enrolled in clinical trials, making them more of a work in progress and not a standardized method of determining disease onset in Alzheimer’s patients.

Federal Alzheimer’s Activity. The revisions to the diagnostic guidelines – the first in nearly three decades – indicate how far scientists have come in understanding the disease and are reflected in new legislation introduced in both the Senate (S.738) and the House (H.R.1386) that would expand Medicare coverage of Alzheimer’s to cover “comprehensive Alzheimer’s disease diagnosis and services,” including for individuals who fall under stage (1) or (2) of the new guidelines.

More significantly, the new guidelines and proposed legislation follow closely on the heels of the passage, earlier this year, of the National Alzheimer’s Project Act (NAPA). NAPA (pdf) charges the Secretary of Health and Human Services with developing “an integrated national plan to overcome Alzheimer’s,” including by accelerating the development of treatments, improving patient diagnosis and care and coordinating efforts across all Federal agencies. Although NAPA did not include any Federal appropriations, its supporters believe it represents a significant commitment to fighting the disease and will lead to an increase in funding, as well as in awareness.

DTC APOE Testing. As Alzheimer’s researchers continue to refine how to define and diagnose the disease – and, of course, seek treatments as well – and the Federal government attempts to coordinate and strengthen its attack on the disease, a few companies are offering consumers the ability to take diagnostic testing for Alzheimer’s disease into their own hands.

Recently, direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing company 23andMe introduced an optional Alzheimer’s health report for its customers (of European ancestry). 23andMe customers who have been genotyped on the company’s latest platform – or who are willing to upgrade – can choose to learn which variants of the apolipoprotein E (APOE) gene they carry. The APOE gene, which comes in at least three different versions or alleles (ε2, ε3 and ε4), has been shown to affect an individual’s risk of developing late-onset Alzheimer’s, although the full physiological and genetic complexity of the disease is likely far from understood.

While 23andMe’s customers must separately choose to learn their APOE status, and are presented with a detailed report (pdf) outlining the gene’s predictive limitations in the face of other important factors, at least one prominent Alzheimer’s researcher has already criticized 23andMe for providing APOE results DTC. Allen Roses, a researcher at Duke University who helped to identify the link between APOE and late-onset Alzheimer’s disease, “believes that 23andMe should not report APOE status through DTC channels,” according to Pharmacogenomics Reporter. (In addition to 23andMe, other DTC genetic testing services, including the Decode Genetics service deCODEme, also offer customers the opportunity to examine their APOE status.)

At the center of the debate is whether individuals will benefit or be harmed, on balance, from learning whether they are at increased risk of developing a genetically influenced – but not determined – condition such as Alzheimer’s Disease for which there is no known cure.

This is exactly the issue that researchers at Boston University have sought to examine through the REVEAL (Risk Evaluation and Education for Alzheimer’s Disease) Study. While the REVEAL study is ongoing, proponents of DTC genetic testing in general, and of APOE testing in particular, point to preliminary findings which indicated that reporting APOE status to individuals “did not result in significant short-term psychological risks.” (pdf) Study researchers also recently published additional findings, concluding that one year after the initial disclosure of APOE status “test recipients still consider the pros to strongly outweigh the cons.”

Opponents of DTC testing, on the other hand, note that (1) the preliminary REVEAL findings measure only short-term outcomes, (2) individuals who tested negative for the APOE genotype associated with higher risk did experience reduced test-related distress, and (3) the initial REVEAL data involved subjects with significant exposure to Alzheimer’s disease who received direct access to genetic counseling, neither of which may apply to many DTC customers. (For more, see the final section of this Pharmacogenomics Reporter piece.)

A Matter of Utility. Then there is the issue of “clinical utility.” While there is no universally accepted definition of “clinical utility,” it is generally used to refer to the usefulness of a test or other procedure to alter (hopefully for the better) medical care. For example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in describing its ACCE model process for evaluating genetic tests, defines clinical utility as “how likely the test is to significantly improve patient outcomes.”

At least for the moment, there is no established cure or prevention strategy for Alzheimer’s disease, meaning that a genetic test designed to indicated predisposition to the disease fails to satisfy many traditional definitions of “clinical utility.” This lack of clinical utility, particularly for pre-symptomatic individuals, is frequently cited as a reason why such information should not be returned. For example, Muin Khoury, director of the CDC’s Office of Public Health Genomics, told Pharmacogenomics Reporter he believes tests that lack a sufficient level of demonstrated clinical utility, including, presumably, APOE testing, “should be offered in a medical setting, with counseling,” and should not be made available DTC. Similarly, last fall the European Society of Human Genetics issued genetic testing guidelines (pdf) in which it opposed “the premature DTC commercialization of various genetic tests,” including tests for which clinical utility is unproven.

Proponents of DTC genetic testing, including 23andMe, have adopted a very different perspective, arguing that APOE information – as with other genetic information – should be available to any individual who desires it. The “utility” noted by DTC proponents is slightly different, with a focus on “personal” as opposed to “clinical” utility. Even if it is unable to alter a course of treatment or improve a patient’s likely outcome, genetic information may still possess significant personal utility for some individuals.

For example, to return to APOE testing, the REVEAL study has demonstrated that even though there are no proven effective treatments for Alzheimer’s Disease, providing participants with genetic information regarding their genetic risk of Alzheimer’s has been found “to be useful by allowing [individuals] to prepare their families and arrange personal affairs including long-term care.” (The quoted language is supplied by Khoury et al. and is the byproduct of a 2009 joint NIH/CDC workshop investigating, among other topics, the utility of personal genomic tests. A summary is also available here.)

What’s Next? For patients and family suffering through Alzheimer’s at any stage of the disease, the hope is that increased Federal funding and continued scientific awareness will continue to improve the ability to diagnose the disease early and accurately but, soon, begin to supply effective treatments or even preventative measures.

As for DTC genetic testing for Alzheimer’s disease, 23andMe now offers what is likely the most widely available and least expensive DTC test (although there are other avenues for consumer-ordered APOE genetic testing, including DTC competitor deCODEme) and has pushed the door wide open for individuals to directly assess (a portion of) their genetic risk for Alzheimer’s disease. At least so far, despite objections from scientists and policymakers like Roses, Khoury and others, regulators have not expressed any public concern with 23andMe’s decision to offer APOE testing and Alzheimer’s risk analysis as part of its service.

Looking ahead, however, there are at least two potential barriers to the continued availability of DTC APOE genetic testing. With the FDA continuing to evaluate the appropriate regulatory approach to DTC genetic testing (the latest opportunity for public comment closed earlier this month), there is no guarantee that DTC genetic testing services such as the one offered by 23andMe will remain available indefinitely in its current form.

And more specifically to DTC APOE genetic testing, Turna Ray of Pharmacogenomics Reporter recently noted that Duke University is considering whether DTC companies, including 23andMe, are infringing APOE patents developed by Duke and exclusively licensed to Athena Diagnostics. As discussed in Ray’s article, a variety of factors, including the uncertain status of Duke’s APOE patents (which claim an association between APOE variants and Alzheimer’s risk) in light of the ongoing Myriad gene patent litigation, suggest that both Duke and Athena may elect to be cautious in considering whether to challenge 23andMe’s DTC APOE testing.

For the moment, anyway, new and recent customers of 23andMe (those genotyped on the company’s current v3 platform) have the option to explore their APOE status if they so choose. Earlier customers (those genotyped on the v2 platform) are left with a choice: upgrade to 23andMe’s latest offering, wait until a later date for APOE genotyping or, as my colleagues at Genomes Unzipped will discuss soon, make an educated guess on the basis of their v2 results.

What’s new and interesting here is not the substance of VerBruggen’s analysis. Whether or not you agree with Verbruggen’s particular formulation, the “paternalism” critique of proposed FDA regulation of DTC genetic testing is not new. What caught our eye is a comment from deCODE genetics’ CEO Kári Stefánsson. When questioned by VerBruggen about his company’s marketing of its DTC genetic test offering, deCODEme (see screenshot) – which includes statements such as “your genes are a road-map to better health” – here is how Stefánsson responded:

“I think that is both cheesy and somewhat incorrect. I don’t know who came up with that, but whoever it is, is going to be duly punished,” [Stefánsson] said. “I think it’s safe to say we’ll probably be removing that statement and putting up something that at least sounds better.”

After its well-publicized 2009 bankruptcy, deCODE emerged in 2010 as a privately-held company and so it is unlikely the public will know whether Stefánsson follows through with his promise to “duly punish” the source of the “road-map” statement. On the other hand, whether and how deCODE follows through with Stefánsson’s not-quite-a-promise to change deCODEme’s marketing and claims is something that will happen in full view of the public.

Why does DTC marketing matter? One of the major challenges for DTC genetic testing companies, since the industry’s inception, has been the ongoing attempt to tightrope the distinction between offering genetic tests and services that appeal to consumers (and, by extension, investors) without overly alarming state and federal regulators. The reasons for this delicate balancing act seem clear. On the one hand, a genetic test that provides a “road-map to better health” is much more likely to induce a consumer to pay several hundred dollars or more out of her own pocket than the same test promoted solely as a mere informational or educational tool. On the other hand, genetic tests intended to affect a consumer’s health or well-being, and marketed accordingly, are certain to draw far closer scrutiny from the FDA and other regulators.

We examined this issue nearly 18 months ago in “The Open Secret of DTC Medical Genetic Testing.” In many important respects the analysis has changed little since then. While the composition of the industry has changed somewhat, many of the companies still providing true DTC genetic testing products continue to attempt the seemingly impossible task of enticing consumers to purchase genetic tests by highlighting their potential clinical significance while using fine print to argue that their products’ intended uses are informational and educational.

Take, for example, leading DTC genetic testing company 23andMe. The company currently offers a single product featuring both health and ancestry components. Their “health” product page (see screenshot) offers consumers a chance to use DNA to “help you plan for the important things in life,”  “take charge of your health and wellness today” and “make better health decisions by learning your genetic risks.”

As was the case 18 months ago, however, the company’s Terms of Service continue to strike a somewhat different tune:

23andMe Services are for research, informational, and educational use only. We do not provide medical advice. The Genetic Information provided by 23andMe is for research, informational, and educational use only….23andMe does not recommend or endorse any specific course of action, resources, tests, physician or other health care providers, drugs, biologics, medical devices or other products, procedures, opinions, or other information that may be mentioned on our website. As explained on our website, 23andMe believes that (a) genetics is only part of the picture of any individual’s state of being, (b) the state of the understanding of Genetic Information is rapidly evolving and at any given time we only comprehend part of the picture of the role of genetics, and (c) only a trained physician or other health care provider can assess your current state of health or disease, taking into account many factors, including in some cases your genetics as well as your current symptoms, if any. Reliance on any information provided by 23andMe, 23andMe employees, others appearing on our website at the invitation of 23andMe, or other visitors to our website is solely at your own risk. (emphasis in original)

Most consumers, and probably the FDA as well, would be excused for taking away two fairly different messages from 23andMe’s product marketing and claims and its underlying Terms of Service.

The FDA and Intended Use. The FDA, for its part, has maintained that its regulatory interest lies with clinical DTC genetic tests (pdf), and has previously indicated and recently confirmed that the basis for determining whether a genetic test is clinical, and thus subject to FDA oversight, is the test’s “intended use” (and not its actual or potential clinical significance).

This is consistent with §201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), which defines a medical device subject to the FDA’s authority as one “intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease…” It would also appear to logically require an FDA policy whereby DTC genetic tests clearly limited to research, educational or informational intended uses would not be subject to FDA regulation.

The claims of DTC genetic testing companies have been scrutinized before, especially last summer during the events leading up to and following the Congressional hearing and GAO report. As the FDA and other federal (e.g., FTC) and state regulators continue to ponder what’s next for these companies, it’s a safe bet that DTC marketing and product claims will come under closer scrutiny still, not just to ensure their accuracy but also to determine which products are subject to FDA regulation (and to what degree).

When it comes to DTC genetic testing, nothing is certain. Still, we think it likely that one consequence of closer regulatory oversight will be that DTC companies are forced to choose, and to much more clearly convey to their potential customers, whether they are offering a clinical service (e.g., one designed to provide clinically useful information or to otherwise affect the individual’s health or well-being) or merely an informational service (e.g., one designed to provide access to personalized genetic information, possibly in conjunction with certain interpretive tools). The former is certain to be far more tightly regulated than the latter, at least at the outset.

Again, as we wrote several times following this month’s DTC meeting, such an outcome is highly unlikely to result in meaningful limitations on the ability of motivated consumers to access their own raw genetic or genomic data. It is likely, however, to result in a greater degree of clarity and consistency with respect to the marketing and product claims of DTC genetic testing products and services (although exactly how and by whom this will be enforced remains unclear at this time). In the long run, that development should benefit DTC companies, consumers and the industry as a whole.

1. Will the $1,000 genome live up to the hype?

2. Will personal genomics stay DTC?

3. How will the ongoing gene patent debate affect the progress of personalized medicine?

4. When and where will the next regulatory shoe fall?

5. Who will control the data?

A year later the question that comes first to mind is, has anything really changed?

The short answer is no, not fundamentally, although that is not meant to imply that nothing of note happened in 2010. Far from it, as significant legal, regulatory, policy and technological developments continued to reshape the personal genomics landscape.

With that in mind, we welcome 2011 with a look back at the year that was, and a look ahead at what to expect from 2011 and beyond.

The $1,000 Genome. With the draft human genome sequence turning 10 this past year, numerous media outlets reflected on the contributions of genomics and personalized medicine over the past decade. A frequent focal point – and measure of success – was the march toward what Keith Robison has termed the “arbimagical goal” of the $1,000 genome. Companies and investors continue to be enamored of low-cost, high-throughput genome sequencing, as evidenced in part by the IPOs of Complete Genomics and Pacific Biosciences this past fall.

At the same time, as we’ve written previously, the goal is not inexpensive genomics, but personal genomics. What matters is not how much it costs to generate a genome sequence (i.e., raw data), but what you can do with that genome once you have it. Thus, genomics is only personal once both the data and the interpretation are individually tailored.

2011 seems likely to be the year in which we finally crack the $1,000 barrier for a data-only genome, driven in large part by continued advances in sequencing technology, including Ion Torrent’s new Personal Genome Machine. But interpreting the data is another story. Already the dominant meme of 2011 is: “$1,000 genome; $100,000 analysis?”

If you’re waiting for a $1,000 genome delivered by your doctor, complete with advice about how to use the data to improve your health, Matthew Herper of Forbes advises you not to hold your breath. Likewise, analyst Amanda Murphy of the investment firm William Blair, believes that “the wide-scale incorporation of whole genome sequencing into the clinical realm is 10 or more years away.” Herper, Murphy and others think interpreted, clinical-grade genomes are going to remain elusive and expensive, particularly in the short-term and certainly for 2011. At Genetic Future, Daniel MacArthur largely agrees, but notes that for consumers willing to take more of a do-it-yourself approach, a $1,000 genome is a distinct and near-term possibility.

By 2012, motivated do-it-yourself (DIY) genomics pioneers like MacArthur will be able to locate cheap data and free or nearly-free tools to help make sense of that data for around $1,000 (not counting their own labor costs). And patients with an acute clinical need, particularly sufferers of cancer and certain rare diseases, will find that genomics plays an increasingly important role in their care, with insurers or even researchers or healthcare providers bearing the brunt of the cost.

However, the majority of us – non-scientists and generally healthy – are likely to find that full-genome sequences continue to remain just out of reach. With the combined cost of obtaining both complete genomic data and a layperson-accessible, reasonably accurate and personalized interpretation of that data remaining well north of $1,000 through 2011 and beyond, the number of consumers who choose to plunge into their full genomes will remain comparatively small. Most individuals will opt to dip their toe in the gene pool, paying several hundred dollars for a more modestly-sized chunk of personalized genomic data (e.g., the 1,000,000+ SNPs genotyped and analyzed by the likes of 23andMe) while they wait for either a clinical (and reimbursable) need to sequence or the cost of an interpreted personal genome to fall further.

As Yogi might say, the $1,000 genome may arrive this year, but it will still cost more than a grand, at least for most of us.

DTC Personal Genomics. For many, “personal genomics” is synonymous with “direct-to-consumer (DTC) genomics.” But despite the continued decline in the cost of genomic data, we begin 2011 with fewer significant providers of DTC genomic services than at the start of 2010.

The major developments have been covered extensively here at the Genomics Law Report. From the Pathway/Walgreens kerfuffle (and the FDA’s response) to the Congressional hearing and critical GAO report (and the FDA’s response), 2010 was certainly a tough year in Washington for DTC companies. (For a complete recap see: The Past, Present and Future of DTC Genetic Testing Regulation.)

While some erstwhile DTC providers (in particular Navigenics and Pathway Genomics) have, at least for the time being, shelved the consumer-facing side of their business, others continue to push forward. 23andMe remains the DTC front-runner, recently raising funds from both venture capitalists and the National Institutes of Health, but a handful of other DTC providers (including deCODE genetics) continue to offer products while a new generation of DIY genomics companies and researchers strive to put genetic data directly into the hands of increasingly large numbers of individuals.

For all of the apparent interest in DTC genomics from Congress and the FDA, the reality is that neither has yet articulated a clear plan to regulate that industry and, at the same time, both lawmakers and the regulators have bigger fish to fry in 2011. DTC personal genomics providers and their tests represent a mere fraction of the laboratory developed tests (LDTs) the FDA has vowed to regulate more aggressively and expansively than ever before (more on this below).

More importantly, the market for DTC personal genomics pales in comparison (at least in terms of market size and clinical importance, although perhaps not necessarily media coverage) to a host of other pressing issues facing Congress, the FDA and other regulatory agencies in 2011. These include, in no special order, the development, regulation and reimbursement of companion and other advanced diagnostics, follow-on biologics, how to deal with a rise in genomic data in regulatory submissions and what to do about whole-genome sequencing in particular and, of course, the fate of the healthcare reform legislation.

Remember, too, that following the recent mid-term election there will be personnel turnover in Washington as well. To cite two examples: the FDA’s No. 2 official, Joshua Sharfstein, has already resigned and one of the most vocal critics of DTC genetic testing during last summer’s House hearing, Congressman Parker Griffith – who compared providing genetic information to consumers with throwing live snakes into a crowded hearing room: useful only to incite panic – failed to win reelection.

Stepping back to view the prospect of DTC genetic testing regulation through this broader lens helps explain why, despite continuing uncertainty and ominous regulatory overtures, the DTC industry is likely to survive 2011 intact. Just as it did in 2010.

That is not to say that industry will not face increased scrutiny in 2011; or that this would be a bad thing.

There continues to be a clear need for more industry transparency, as well as heightened regulation of the advertising and marketing practices of existing genetic testing companies. The arrival of the NIH’s genetic testing registry (GTR), although not without its own critics, remains slated to arrive this spring. The GTR, along with increased enforcement of existing regulations from agencies like the FDA and the FTC, could do much to put a halt to true consumer abuses in the DTC personal genomics market.

There is also a widespread recognition that the DTC industry would benefit from greater standardization. A primary need is for greater definitional clarity. Terms like “DTC genomics” and “DIY genomics” frequently receive user-defined and inconsistent definitions, and no regulation – whether government- or self-imposed – will be practical until this terminological confusion is resolved. More substantively, there is a clear need to develop data standards, including both a standard format for returning genomic data as well as for interpreting and reporting those data. While DTC companies have frequently expressed interest in pursuing the latter, including in cooperation with federal agencies, considerable progress in all of these areas still needs to be made.

Of course, while unlikely, it remains a possibility that regulators or lawmakers will succeed in directly regulating DTC personal genomics in 2011. This could happen as part of the broader LDT regulatory movement or, more likely, take the form of narrower and more targeted regulatory requirements, such as interposing a physician or genetic counselor between the company and consumer at the ordering and/or data delivery stage. Or the FDA could always come up with some other out-of-the-box approach to DTC regulation.

Nevertheless, as we enter 2011 it remains legal throughout most of the United States to provide healthy individuals with direct access to their personal genomic data. While that is not the case worldwide, technological innovation and the proliferation of genomic data and of DIY genomic tools will drive continued growth and diversification of the DTC personal genomics landscape in the United States in 2011 and beyond.

Gene Patents. Without question, last year’s biggest story was – and continues to be – the ongoing Myriad gene patent litigation. Judge Robert Sweet’s jaw-dropping district court decision invalidated Myriad’s challenged patents across the board, for the moment, and thrust the debate further into the public and political spotlight than ever before.

While we entered 2010 anticipating a decision in Myriad, as well as in other important litigation (notably Prometheus and Bilski), we wrote that “there is little reason to believe that 2010 will be the year that the gene patent question will be finally resolved.” And we’re fully prepared to say the exact same thing in 2011 (and possibly in 2012, as well).

Those who first caught wind of the gene patent issue in March of 2010 (when Sweet’s opinion issued) may find it inconceivable that by the end of 2011 – a full 21 months later – there could be no resolution. But courts move slowly, and with the Supreme Court choosing once again to ignore biotechnology patents (the Supremes issued a heavily hyped Bilski opinion that proved to be just hype, and little more), the Federal Circuit rehearing Prometheus and saying exactly what it said in 2009 and the Myriad litigation in all likelihood multiple appeals from reaching its conclusion, a definitive answer does not appear imminent. Those waiting on the courts to resolve the patentability of genes or the increasingly important diagnostic methods at issue in Myriad, as well as Prometheus and Classen, are going to be forced to keep waiting.

Still, just as in 2010, 2011 will see its share of high-profile gene patent opinions issuing from courts. The most eagerly anticipated is the Federal Circuit’s Myriad opinion, which is expected in late spring or early summer. But the likelihood that Myriad or any other legal opinion will bring substantial and lasting clarity to the patentability of genes and related diagnostic methods in 2011 is slim.

However, not all parties are likely to be content to sit idly by and wait for the courts to decide (or not) the issue of gene patents. 2010 saw the publication of the highly publicized and equally controversial SACGHS report on gene patents and licensing. The report sparked plenty of conversation in biotechnology industry and policy circles and, though the SACGHS was disbanded later in 2010, those conversations have not quieted (as evidenced, in part, by the Justice Department’s unexpected amicus brief in Myriad). As genomic sequencing and diagnostic tools play an increasingly prominent role in clinical care, the role of patents – as either facilitators or inhibitors of personalized medicine innovation – will come under increasing scrutiny.

Persistent patent uncertainty continues to be a challenge for biotechnology companies and their investors. In large part for that reason, many are actively seeking out alternative pathways through the increasingly thorny gene patent thicket. Thus, don’t be surprised if 2011’s most noteworthy gene patent developments happen outside of the courtroom.

Legislation and Regulation. There was a lot of talk about regulating genetic testing in 2010, but the most significant regulatory action occurred late in the year with the EEOC’s publication of final regulations for Title II of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), which finally took effect this past week. With the increasing proliferation of genetic information, expect to see GINA – now in its third full year as law – in the headlines with more frequency in 2011.

As for genetic testing regulation, yes, 2011 could be the year that the FDA implements sweeping regulatory changes for laboratory developed tests (LDTs), including most genetic tests. But after announcing its intent to do just that back in June, the second half of 2010 came and went without significant follow-up activity from the FDA. After watching the FDA attempt to regulate a subset of LDTs (in vitro diagnostic multivariate index assays, or IVDMIAs) for four years before sending IVDMIA regulation to the regulatory trash heap for good late in 2010, there is good reason to be skeptical.

There’s a reasonable likelihood that the FDA will offer at least one concrete proposal for an LDT regulatory framework in 2011. But don’t expect that proposal – whatever its particulars – to be embraced by regulated entities, and we certainly wouldn’t bet on the FDA being able to finalize such an initiative and produce final guidance (or regulations, depending on which way it chooses, or is forced, to proceed) in the same year.

Other possibilities include two oft-discussed pieces of personalized medicine legislation, the Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act (GPMA) and the yet-to-be-introduced bill from Senator Hatch on advanced personalized diagnostics. But as we sit here today, the most likely scenario is that 2011 will bring no significant new final legislation or regulation affecting genomics and personalized medicine.

Such a rapidly-moving field poses substantial challenges for overburdened lawmakers and regulators even in the best of political environments and 2011, with its newly divided Congress and promise of contentious battles over healthcare reform and other key issues, hardly qualifies as an ideal political environment. Never say never, but those who would bring legislative and regulatory change to personal genomics are likely to spend 2011 primarily laying the groundwork for 2012 and beyond.

Access and Control. Our final question last year continues as perhaps the most important of 2011: who will control the data?

All of the issues above – from how much a genome will cost to who will be able to purchase one and whether a company can patent parts of it – reflect concern with access to and control of genomic data. Laws like GINA protect the use of genetic information in certain contexts, but at present there is no federal genetic privacy law and little consensus on whether an individual owns her own genetic material and data once it leaves her body.

As courts and legislatures continue to wrestle with these issues across an increasingly broad range of factual backgrounds – from state-mandated testing of newborns for genetic disease to the use of forensic DNA to monitor an increasingly broad subset of the country’s criminal (and frequently non-criminal) population – the pressure to clarify the rights individuals have in their genomes will intensify. Will we (along with courts and legislatures) conceptualize genomic data primarily as personal, with the individual the locus of control, or as medical, routing access and interpretation through the healthcare system?

Other challenges of no less importance will continue to demand attention in 2011 and beyond. We have already discussed, above, the issue of access to personal genomic data, and, indeed, no less an authority than NIH Director Francis Collins has written that “free and open access to genome data has had a profoundly positive effect on progress.”

But even as we strive to maintain broad and individualized access to genomic data, we will simultaneously need to ensure that those without the means (financial or otherwise) or desire to pursue their own genomic data are still able to benefit from personalized genomics. Among many, many challenges, this will require continuing the uphill battle to retrofit a healthcare system populated with institutions and individuals largely unprepared to handle the increasing size and complexity of incoming genomic data.

We Will Finish Where We Started. Again. These are big challenges, and they will not be met in full in 2011. We are confident that, when 2012 rolls around, most (and perhaps all) of the same issues will present themselves yet again to the field of personal genomics.

The $1,000 genome will continue to remain more hype than reality for most individuals. DTC personal genomics will continue to spark concern from legislators and regulators, tantalizing unscrupulous businesspeople even as it is embraced by an increasingly broad segment of the population. Gene patents will remain an unsettled area of law, even as public and private efforts to resolve the issue progress. The specter of FDA regulation will continue to loom large—and advance slowly. And, most importantly, while more people than ever before will have affordable and largely unfettered access to their genomic data, that access will be uneven, with many who could benefit most from personal genomics denied that opportunity.

Still, even as personal genomics’ challenges remain largely the same today as they were in 2010, and likely will be again in 2012, progress is apparent. After all that happened in 2010, perhaps all that really changed in the last year is that personal genomics is now a year older, a year wiser and continuing to advance. And perhaps that is enough. At least for 2011.

The first is primarily a curiosity: the allegation that Chinese authorities are spying on deCode Genetics, Iceland’s most prominent genetic research company and provider of the direct-to-consumer genetic testing service, deCODEme. Nobody seems to know exactly what China is looking to gain by clandestinely exploring Iceland’s genetic genealogy. You are welcome to speculate in the comments.

The second raises broader issues: the revelation that the State Department’s ongoing human intelligence collection directives include requests for “biometric information” on key world leaders, including United Nations arms inspectors, the Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO) and key advisors and aides to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. A separate cable detailing intelligence collection priorities in Africa’s Great Lakes region clarifies that “biometric information” includes “health [data]…fingerprints, facial images, DNA, and iris scans.”

Not disclosed in the WikiLeaked cables: why the State Department wants the biometric data or whether any have been successfully obtained.

Surreptitious Testing: An Overview. The cables are, however, a reminder that the law surrounding the surreptitious collection and testing of biometric data, including DNA, remains extremely murky.

While the extent to which surreptitious testing is performed in diplomatic and intelligence contexts is not publicly known, such testing is commonplace in law enforcement settings. For example, police routinely collect and analyze “abandoned DNA” during forensic investigations. Indeed, one of the primary indices of the FBI-run Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) is the Forensic Index. The Forensic Index is comprised of DNA profiles constructed from biological specimens from unidentified individuals collected at crime scenes. These DNA profiles are then compared against similar offender and arrestee indices, which are also housed in CODIS, to aid in law enforcement efforts. Several high-profile criminal investigations, including the recent arrest of the “Grim Sleeper” serial killer, have been aided by this technique.

Concerns about surreptitious sampling and testing have also appeared in other contexts. During this past summer’s Congressional hearing on direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) presented results from a series of undercover encounters with DTC companies. One recording appeared to show a company (later identified as Pathway Genomics) encouraging a prospective customer to collect and send in a saliva sample from her fiancé without his consent, in order to surprise him with results of a genetic test.

In 2009, New Scientist reporters Peter Aldhous and Michael Reilly used similar tactics to demonstrate that it was possible to obtain genetic information about someone without that individual’s consent and detailed their experiences in a special investigation: how my genome was hacked.

Shortly after the 2008 presidential election, an article appearing in The New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) considered the possibility that, by the time the 2012 election rolls around, presidential candidates might be at significant risk of surreptitious genetic testing. The authors worried that “persons or groups opposing a candidate [and] hoping to harm his or her chances for election” would obtain and release genetic information without consent, a form of “genetic McCarthyism.” This would not be very difficult, the authors concluded, since “sufficient DNA for amplification and analysis can be obtained from loose hairs, coffee cups, discarded utensils, or even a handshake.” The WikiLeaks revelations about State Department officials seeking biometric information on world leaders indicate that the NEJM speculation may already be reality on the world stage.

There are numerous other scenarios in which surreptitious genetic testing might be employed to acquire information about less famous but equally unwitting individuals, including to establish paternity or to evaluate a potential romantic partner.

Legal Uncertainty Surrounds Surreptitious Testing. To many, it seems like “there oughta be a law” against surreptitious genetic testing, at least in certain settings. However, as reported last year by the Genetics & Public Policy Center, there are “limited legal safeguards against surreptitious DNA testing or its potential consequences for those subject to nonconsensual testing.”

While the 2008 passage of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) prohibits the unauthorized acquisition or use of genetic information in certain contexts (health insurance and employment), it offers only limited protection against surreptitious testing. For instance, while it covers most of the Federal government, including the State Department, GINA does not apply to the military or the VA. It also does not restrict behavior outside of the insurance and employment contexts including, for example, by political adversaries or their supporters during a presidential campaign. (Interestingly, the NEJM article declined to advocate for “laws that would make it a federal crime to sequence a candidate’s DNA without consent,” preferring voluntary restraints and education instead.)

Other Federal statutes, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) may offer protection under certain scenarios (e.g., the use and disclosure of genetic information by covered entities, predominantly health plans and healthcare providers) but, again, fall short of providing a complete and clear prohibition on surreptitious genetic testing.

The 2008 GPPC report also looked at state law to evaluate which states proscribe surreptitious DNA testing (pdf). Determining the exact number of states that prohibit this behavior depends heavily on context. Some state statutes prohibit unauthorized acquisition or analysis of genetic information, while others apply only to unauthorized disclosures. Similarly, some state statutes appear to encompass all manner of genetic information, whereas others cover only certain genetic information (e.g., health-related information) or apply only to certain settings (e.g., employment or insurance discrimination). The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) has also compiled data on state genetic privacy laws and, like the GPPC report, the NCSL data indicates considerable variability at the state level.

In the absence of a comprehensive federal law, state prohibitions are currently the main source of relevant law when it comes to restricting surreptitious genetic testing. But not all states have such laws. Whether surreptitious genetic testing is illegal thus typically depends on a combination of who is doing the testing, whom they are testing, what they are testing for, how they are using the results and, most of all, the state or states in which those activities take place.

Finally, there is a possibility that surreptitious genetic sampling and testing may be prohibited on either common law or constitutional grounds, at least in certain situations. For example, in the Texas newborn blood spot litigation, which we covered earlier this year, the plaintiffs alleged both Fourth Amendment (unreasonable search and seizure) and Fourteenth Amendment (right to privacy) violations resulting from the state’s policy of retaining newborn blood spots for ongoing research without explicit parental consent. While both claims survived summary judgment, and may have helped precipitate the litigation’s settlement, these and other legal theories remain untested in most states and under most circumstances.

What We Should Learn From WikiLeaks. Coming full circle, the leaked State Department communiqués raise important questions to which we do not have clear answers. In particular: under what circumstances is the surreptitious collection of biometric data, including genetic data, appropriate?

For most, the answer to that question will depend to some degree on context. Should State Department officials gathering intelligence abroad have a greater or lesser ability to pursue surreptitious genetic testing than domestic law enforcement agents? Should private individuals be permitted to conduct surreptitious genetic testing in certain circumstances (e.g., to confirm paternity) but not others (e.g., when shadowing a politician or celebrity)?

While individual answers may vary, we expect the law to provide us with clear guidelines. As is made clear by the above analysis, however, there exists a wide range of scenarios where surreptitious genetic testing, should it occur, would fall squarely within a legal gray area.

This is in stark contrast to the situation in other countries. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the Human Tissue Act 2004 made it a “criminal offence to take a sample from someone to test their DNA without their consent, except for medical purposes and lawful investigative purposes” as of 2006. Similarly, while Germany’s new Human Genetic Examination Act (also known as the GenDG) is overly restrictive in many respects, § 8(1) of the GenDG (pdf) clearly prohibits “any genetic examination or analysis” without the “express, written consent of the subject person, both in regard to the respective genetic examination and genetic sample.”

Whether the United States adopts the same approach to surreptitious genetic testing or not, the issue must be addressed. We must articulate, much more clearly than at present, the situations in which unconsented genetic testing, analysis and disclosure is permissible, and those in which it is proscribed.

Each year, the availability of low-cost, high-quality genetic information expands. Along with a wide array of legitimate and beneficial uses, the growing accessibility of this genetic information brings with it an increasing number of opportunities to employ and to abuse surreptitious genetic testing. As we continue to push forward into the era of personal genomics, the time has come to seriously discuss a comprehensive legal framework for surreptitious genetic testing.

[Editor’s Note:

On Tuesday, Carmichael and five commentators examined what can be learned from a DTC genetic test. Yesterday, the topic was whether DTC genetic tests are trustworthy, and whether the results can be cause for concern. Today’s topic is the regulation of DTC genetic tests. In addition to several short commentaries, including a much shorter version of the piece below, Carmichael has also posted a lengthy interview with two top FDA officials on the subject of DTC genetic testing regulation.

The column below is an expanded version of what appears over at Newsweek. To see all of the commentaries in Carmichael’s series, click here.]

The recent media attention focused on direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic tests has left companies, investors, consumers and even regulators scrambling to figure out what comes next.

As the situation stands today, companies and their investors live in a climate of unprecedented regulatory uncertainty, causing delays in the introduction of new products and rendering an already inhospitable economic climate – for both fundraising and sales – even more challenging. Commentators and regulators caution consumers that some DTC genetic tests may be unreliable or, worse, harmful, but have yet to provide clear tools and guidelines for evaluating competing tests. And regulators, including the FDA, must balance their mandate to protect the health and safety of the public with that same public’s desire for autonomy, while also recognizing that innovation is a prerequisite for a healthcare system that must continue to improve outcomes while reducing costs.

Clearly, something must change. But what will that change be? And how will the field of DTC genetic testing evolve? Will DTC be able to continue its current business while regulators and companies engage in protracted negotiations? Will oversight weed out the “snake oil salesmen” and permit legitimate companies to flourish? Will it drive all genetic testing (temporarily) out of the hands of consumers?

Or will the field change in a dramatic and completely unexpected way?

These questions, and others, caused Newsweek science editor Mary Carmichael to realize her oft-debated question – To Test or Not To Test? – might demand an answer sooner rather than later:

. . . I started to worry . . . . How much time did I even have left to decide whether I was going to take a test myself? Even before [last month’s Congressional] hearing, the FDA had announced its plans to regulate all DTC genetic tests, possibly so heavily as to keep them off the market; the hearing was just the sort of thing that could push it to move faster. What if, by the time I finally decided if I wanted one of these tests, I couldn’t buy one anymore?

Setting aside the question of whether Carmichael, or anybody else, should buy a genetic test, this column examines the history of DTC genetic testing regulation in the United States¹ and, in the final section, whether the DTC option is likely to persist in the future.

Because this post is longer than usual, here is a quick, clickable roadmap to its various sections. If you’re already familiar with the history of DTC genetic testing you may wish to jump ahead to the final section or two.

1. 2006: DTC and the First GAO Report.

2. 2007: The Beginning of Modern DTC

3. 2008: SACGHS and a Scare From the States

4. 2009: All Quiet on the DTC Front

5. 2010: DTC Goes to Washington

6. Today: Uncertainty Reigns

7. Tomorrow: Unintended Effects (and More Uncertainty)

8. Beyond: A Delicate Balancing Act

2006: DTC and the First GAO Report. Four years ago last month, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published a consumer fact sheet entitled “At-Home Genetic Tests: A Healthy Dose of Skepticism May Be the Best Prescription.” The guidance warned consumers to be wary of claims made by DTC genetic testing companies and to involve “a doctor or trained counselor who understands the value of genetic testing for a particular situation” when ordering or interpreting any genetic test.

The joint agency guidance document was published in concert with a report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) entitled “Nutrigenetic Testing: Tests Purchased from Four Web Sites Mislead Consumers” (pdf). The GAO report reviewed a “nonrepresentative selection” of genetic tests available to consumers at that time and concluded that those tests “mislead the consumer by making health-related predictions that are medically unproven and so ambiguous that they do not provide meaningful information to consumers.” The report was praised for “drawing attention to potentially important consumer protection issues,” even as it was criticized for “serious methodological flaws that undermine[d]” those very criticisms (pdf).

Whatever its methodological flaws, the GAO’s description of the system of regulation for DTC genetic testing, which it characterized as one of “minimal oversight [that] makes it difficult for consumers to determine whether a genetic test provides meaningful, scientifically based information,” was entirely accurate.

2007: The Beginning of Modern DTC. With the launch of DTC products from a publicly traded biopharmaceutical company (deCODE Genetics) and a Google-backed startup (23andMe) on back-to-back days in November 2007, the modern era of DTC genetic testing was born. With 23andMe, deCODE and, soon, Navigenics, consumers could now pay around $1,000 to review hundreds of thousands of SNPs. Following Knome’s launch, also late in 2007, they could pay much, much more ($350,000) for access to their entire genome.

Despite this dramatic shift in the DTC product landscape, the legal landscape remained essentially unchanged from 2006. Regulatory oversight was still incomplete, confusing and rarely invoked.

At the federal level, while most DTC genetic tests were likely covered from the outset by the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA), it was typically difficult to determine whether DTC genetic testing companies were operating using CLIA-certified labs. (23andMe, for example, did not begin using a CLIA-certified laboratory until 2008, making the change in response to “evolving” regulatory requirements.) CLIA, which is implemented by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), requires laboratories to demonstrate the analytical validity of their tests, and covers most genetic tests regardless of whether they are provided directly to consumers or not.

In addition to CLIA, a limited number of genetic tests were also regulated by the FDA. Although the proposition was not immediately tested, it was widely assumed that DTC genetic tests constituted a new form of laboratory developed test (LDT), a large and well-established category of tests over which the FDA exercised “enforcement discretion.” While the FDA had historically declined to regulate LDTs, in 2006 and 2007 the FDA expressed its desire to regulate certain types of high-complexity LDTs (so-called IVDMIAs). As is still true today, it was unclear where, if anywhere, the newly introduced DTC genetic tests fell within the LDT conversation and FDA’s larger regulatory universe.

In addition to uncertainty at the federal level, some states possessed (and still do possess) statutes that appear to prohibit – or at least restrict – DTC genetic testing (pdf). However, it was unclear whether such statutes, which clearly predate the arrival of DTC genetic testing in its current form, were intended to prevent DTC genetic testing or whether they would be enforced by state regulators in any event. State-level regulatory restrictions contributed to at least one company withholding its service from citizens in at least 10 states at the time of its launch.

Despite all of this legal uncertainty, no federal or state regulatory agency took any formal action immediately following the introduction of DTC genetic testing to the consumer marketplace.

2008: SACGHS and A Scare from the States. During its first full year, the DTC genetic testing marketplace continued to grow as new companies arrived on the scene and existing companies refined and expanded their offerings.

Meanwhile, an influential government policy committee (SACGHS) had undertaken a review of the “U.S. System of Oversight of Genetic Testing.” When it was published in April of 2008, the 276-page report surprised almost no one when it identified major gaps in the regulation of genetic testing, including insufficient oversight of laboratory quality, clinical validity and a lack of knowledge with respect to the nature and uses of genetic tests available for purchase, whether directly by consumers or otherwise. Among the report’s several recommendations were increased FDA regulatory oversight and the creation of a mandatory, public registry for all laboratory tests.

Shortly after the publication of the SACGHS report, public health officials in New York and California sent “cease and desist” letters to a number of genetic testing companies. The states warned the companies – including 23andMe, deCODE and Navigenics, the three most prominent DTC providers at that time – that they were operating without necessary state licenses.

The SACGHS report and state regulatory letters produced widespread debate about the appropriate regulatory framework for DTC genetic testing. Companies were concerned that other states might follow the example set by New York and California and seek to regulate DTC genetic tests directly, potentially exposing DTC companies to a nightmare scenario of inconsistent, state-by-state regulation. Proponents of regulation, meanwhile, argued that the nascent field needed some regulation “lest abuses discredit the whole industry before it has a chance to thrive.”

In the following weeks, months and even years, some DTC companies received state licenses, although this came at the expense of offering tests directly to consumers in some cases. Other companies ceased selling to customers in specific jurisdictions, and still others simply went out of business. At the federal level, the SACGHS recommendations continued to generate far more discussion than action, and the regulatory landscape remained materially unchanged. Meanwhile, major DTC companies continued to press ahead, and 2008 closed with 23andMe’s DTC genetic test being named Time’s invention of the year.

2009: All Quiet on the DTC Front. In comparison to the years on either side, 2009 was a relatively quiet year for DTC genetic testing, at least from a regulatory perspective.

On the commercial side, however, 2009 saw a number of changes ripple through the DTC genetic testing marketplace. As the price of DTC genetic tests continued to fall, a new competitor, Pathway Genomics, arrived on the scene and 23andMe significantly revamped its product offerings and pricing shortly thereafter. Meanwhile, the financial crisis played a major role in causing DTC pioneer deCODE Genetics to file for bankruptcy protection, although the company quickly emerged under private control and its deCODEme test remains on the market today.

To be sure, regulators continued to ponder how to respond to the rapidly evolving genetic testing marketplace, which included but was not limited to DTC products. For example, the FDA continued to express an interest in regulating some LDTs and the California legislature considered a bill – championed by 23andMe – that would create a special regulatory framework for so-called “post-CLIA bioinformatics services,” although nothing would come of either initiative, at least in 2009. Perhaps most significantly, but unbeknownst to either the public or the major DTC genetic testing companies, Congress had instructed the GAO to begin a second investigation into the DTC genetic testing industry, the results of which would not be made public until the following year.

With regulators seemingly on the sidelines, academics and other commentators, including the Genomics Law Report, continued to stress the need for meaningful self-regulation in order to:

(1) discourag[e] consumers from purchasing products not adequately supported by scientific evidence, (2) provid[e] regulators such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) with a standard against which to evaluate (and sanction) false or misleading DTC tests or services, and (3) ensur[e] that inevitable governmental regulation is not overly restrictive.

Prominent scientists, including soon-to-be NIH chief Francis Collins and genomics pioneer Craig Venter, also emphasized the need for greater transparency and consistency in the way DTC companies presented genetic risk of disease to consumers. While there was widespread consensus, including on the part of DTC providers, that self-regulation and even some form of government regulation would be beneficial for the industry as a whole, by the end of 2009 no notable changes – government mandated, voluntary or otherwise – had materialized.

2010: DTC Goes to Washington. Although we are not yet two thirds of the way through the year, 2010 has already seen an explosion of activity in the oversight of DTC genetic testing.

The first major development came in March, when the NIH announced the creation of a voluntary genetic testing registry. In its 2008 report (pdf), SACGHS had recommended the creation of a “mandatory, publicly available, Web-based registry for laboratory tests” in order to “enhance the transparency of genetic testing and assist efforts in reviewing the clinical validity of laboratory tests.” The NIH adopted this recommendation with one crucial exception: the registry, at least as proposed, will be voluntary.  However, it remains to be seen, particularly in light of everything that has happened since the announcement in March, what form the NIH’s registry will ultimately take when it debuts later this year or in early 2011.

For DTC genetic testing, the excitement really began on May 11th, when Pathway Genomics announced it was partnering with Walgreens to offer its genetic testing service on the shelves of most of the drugstore giant’s 7,500 stores. The FDA responded almost immediately with an “Untitled Agency” letter to Pathway Genomics in which the agency informed Pathway that it could find no record of the necessary FDA clearance or approval for Pathway’s test. The Pathway letter – which represented the FDA’s first public foray into the oversight of DTC genetic testing – was followed by similar letters to five prominent DTC genetic testing companies in early June and letters to 14 more genetic testing companies in late July. These letters were, of course, something of a surprise to the companies. The FDA could not find evidence that it had approved the companies’ tests because, in at least some and possibly all cases, the agency had not told the companies that such approval was necessary.

In addition to taking aim at DTC genetic testing companies, the FDA also announced that it was shelving its plan to regulate a subset of LDTs (i.e., IVDMIAs) in favor of a new plan to regulate all LDTs. Late last month the FDA held a two-day “Public Meeting on Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests” to discuss that plan. (It is important to point out that, despite devoting an entire portion of the public meeting to DTC genetic tests, on multiple occasions the FDA has indicated that it considers at least some DTC genetic tests not to constitute LDTs since the products are “not developed by and used in a single laboratory.”)

Not to be outdone, Congress quickly announced its own investigation into DTC genetic testing (one it had quietly initiated the year before) and followed that up with a public hearing on “Direct-To-Consumer Genetic Testing and the Consequences to Public Health.” The centerpiece of July’s Congressional hearing was yet another GAO report (pdf) whose conclusion was announced in the title: “Direct-To-Consumer Genetic Tests: Misleading Test Results Are Further Complicated by Deceptive Marketing and Other Questionable Practices.” The GAO also presented a striking and widely circulated YouTube video as partial support for its conclusion. (For a more detailed review of the Congressional hearing and the GAO report please see this recap.)

At the Congressional hearing, Jeffrey Shuren, the Director of the FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH), assessed the FDA’s recent activity by agreeing with Congressman Michael Burgess (R-TX) that the FDA “should have acted sooner” to regulate DTC genetic tests. Shuren was likely referring to a perceived failure on the part of the FDA to adequately safeguard the public.  Given the absence of any publicly documented harm resulting from consumer access to genetic tests , however, there are certainly those who would disagree, arguing that the FDA should still refrain from regulating DTC genetic tests.

Listening to Shuren’s remarks at the hearing, one could easily wonder whether his lament was actually directed at the agency having been caught off-guard, at least to a degree, by the debut of the GAO’s striking report, which was unveiled to the public – and the DTC companies themselves – at the hearing.  According to the report (pg. 19) the GAO officially briefed the FDA, NIH and FTC on the contents of the report in late May and early June. However, when I raised this point yesterday during an FDLI webinar on FDA’s (Emerging) Oversight of LDTs, fellow panelist Dr. Elisabeth Mansfield, Director for Personalized Medicine at CDRH, clarified that the GAO’s “briefing” consisted of a teleconference where the FDA learned only the bare fact that the GAO had conducted an inspection and had “found problems.”

Perhaps it is just a perfect storm of coincidences. But in any event, the FDA actions and the GAO report – along with other recent high-profile developments including the Pathway / Walgreens pairing and 23andMe’s “sample swap” – have created unprecedented uncertainty.

Today: Uncertainty Reigns. The GAO report, the FDA’s letters and all of the other events of the past few months have indisputably ratcheted up the level of uncertainty throughout the genetic testing industry.

However, as a purely legal matter, it does not appear that the formal regulatory framework governing DTC genetic testing has changed much if at all in recent months, or even since 2006, particularly at the federal level. Congress has passed no new legislation, and neither the FDA nor any other federal agency has promulgated new regulations or formal agency guidance.   This, of course, is not at all surprising: the rate of development in any new area of science and commerce inevitably surpasses the ability of lawmakers and regulators to keep pace. DTC genetic testing has hardly proved an exception to that rule.

Setting aside the myriad hearings, public and private meetings and statements made to the press by regulators – which, while significant, do not rise to the level of rulemaking – the only formal, public action one can point to is the FDA’s ongoing letter-writing campaign. However, as the FDA has clarified in the past, these “Untitled Letters” remain several steps removed from an FDA enforcement action:

While Warning Letters set out specific violations of law that a company must address immediately or else the agency will take an enforcement action, an Untitled Letter identifies agency concerns and gives a company the opportunity to meet with the agency and to have time to take appropriate steps to address these concerns….Based on how the companies respond to the Untitled Letters, FDA may follow up by sending Warning Letters.

Of course, an absence of documented regulatory change does not imply that the commercial DTC genetic testing landscape has remained anything close to stable.

Responses from DTC companies and investors to today’s uncertainty have varied. Some companies (including Pathway Genomics and Counsyl) have ceased offering their tests directly to consumers, at least for the moment. Others, including two original DTC genetic testing companies (23andMe and deCODE), have expressed a desire to work with regulators while continuing to make their products available to consumers. Many of the major DTC companies, whether or not they are currently offering products directly to consumers, have also criticized both the GAO and the FDA for their approach to DTC genetic testing (see these blog posts at Navigenics, 23andMe and Pathway Genomics) while simultaneously expressing their desire to work with regulators to bring greater oversight to the industry.

Meanwhile, new companies and investors must reevaluate business plans to take into account anticipated regulatory changes.  And customers, including Mary Carmichael, must weigh the possibility that today’s DTC options may disappear from tomorrow’s digital storefronts.

Since 2006, the regulation of DTC genetic testing has been consistently characterized as confusing, incomplete and inconsistently applied. That characterization remains as true today as it was four years ago. So perhaps the only meaningful difference from four years ago is one of degree: more so than at any time over the past four years, there now appears to be a consensus that something must – and will – be done to overhaul the regulation of DTC genetic tests.

Tomorrow: Unintended Effects (and More Uncertainty). But not so fast. Despite the apparent agreement among regulators, industry and most commentators that DTC genetic testing is in need of additional oversight, there is still no guarantee that change is coming soon, or even at all.

Indeed, it is not difficult to look at the events of the past few months and conclude that DTC has been down this road before:

• A GAO report decrying the evils of DTC genetic testing and subsequent Congressional hearing? 2010 and 2006.
• Threatening regulatory letters to DTC companies? 2010 and 2008.
• A controversial FDA regulatory proposal that might – or might not – encompass DTC genetic tests? 2010 and 2006.

Industry watchers who have been around since the beginning would be excused for expressing at least some skepticism that this is the time, finally, when the DTC genetic testing landscape will be fundamentally remade.

Continuing Uncertainty. There is also the possibility that a new regulatory regime for genetic tests will emerge, but that it will push DTC genetic testing to the side and in so doing cause the industry to remain mired in uncertainty.

As the FDA pushes forward with the development of agency guidance for the regulation of LDTs, there are concerns that the agency may carve out many or most DTC genetic tests from this regulatory framework. In June, the FDA expressed its belief that several prominent DTC companies (23andMe, Knome and deCode) are offering tests that do not constitute LDTs because they are “not developed by and used in a single laboratory.”

Recent signals – including the designation of a separate panel for LDTs during the FDA’s two-day public meeting and Jeffrey Shuren’s presentation of DTC genetic tests within the confines of the larger LDT regulatory conversation (pdf) at the recent Congressional hearing – suggest that the FDA may yet find a way to incorporate the regulation of DTC genetic tests into its more ambitious plan to develop a risk-based approach for all LDTs. But for the moment, the FDA appears to be intent on continuing with test-by-test review and regulation.

Unintended Effects. Among its several shortcomings, the current test-by-test approach to DTC genetic testing regulation creates the possibility that a regulatory agency such as the FDA could seek to reshape the industry using indirect methods.

When the FDA sent out its first batch of letters post-Pathway, the one unexpected recipient was array manufacturer Illumina, which, unlike the other companies receiving letters, does not appear to have ever offered its services directly to consumers without the involvement of a physician intermediary. Nor did the FDA allege that it had. Instead, the FDA’s letter to Illumina (pdf) focused on the company’s “Infinium HumanHap550 array used by deCODE Genetics and 23andMe to provide genetic information to their customers.” The FDA charged Illumina with making available an array approved for “Research Use Only” to 23andMe and deCode for use in their own DTC genetic tests.

Why does this matter? As I wrote at the time, not every company has the same set of incentives to resist the FDA’s regulatory proposals. Whereas a company such as 23andMe, which has built its business around DTC genetic testing, has a clear interest in challenging any FDA action that results in its service becoming unavailable to consumers, array manufacturers like Illumina are not similarly situated. As Illumina’s CEO, Jay Flatley, recently noted, the revenue the company “generates from sales of arrays to the DTC market is ‘immaterial.’” By targeting array suppliers such as Illumina, for whom DTC represents only a fraction of their business, the FDA may have identified a way to exert indirect but potentially much more effective regulatory pressure over the industry.

In response, Daniel MacArthur asked yesterday whether the FDA was planning to strangle the supply lines of DTC genetic testing companies by targeting array manufacturers like Illumina. As a regulatory agency charged with implementing legislation passed by Congress, the FDA is extremely unlikely to have an official “agenda” when it comes to DTC genetic testing. That does not mean, however, that the FDA could not determine that genetic testing simply cannot be paired with DTC and still satisfy its interpretation of the law.

If 23andMe or deCode (which is partially owned by Illumina) were to lose access to Illumina’s arrays, would those companies be able to contract with another manufacturer, either based in the U.S. or abroad? Would Illumina take the necessary steps to work with 23andMe and the FDA to clear its array for use in 23andMe’s product? Would this development force such a fundamental shift in the business models of these DTC companies that they would be driven out of business, or perhaps driven overseas?

Even as a hypothetical, the Illumina example illustrates the importance of considering the knock-on effects of regulation. Although the FDA may take the position that its goal is to enforce agency regulations regardless of the effects they produce on a specific business, or even an entire industry, the reality is that there are a number of viable regulatory strategies on the table, and not all of them are equal in their effects.

One of the unfortunate consequences of the test-by-test regulation currently employed by the FDA is that these effects are unlikely to be fully anticipated or explored in advance by regulators. By the same token, one obvious advantage of publicly pursuing a formal system of regulation for DTC genetic testing – e.g., through the development of agency guidance or notice and comment rulemaking – is that such regulatory effects can be explored in advance (in some instances this may even be required of the FDA), rendering them at least intended, even if they remain unwelcome to some.

Other Regulatory Routes. Finally, remember that the FDA may not be left entirely to its own devices in determining how to regulate either LDTs or DTC genetic tests. Several pieces of draft legislation, if enacted, could provide specific Congressional direction as to how the FDA or other regulatory agencies should respond to the challenges raised by these tests.

Current proposals include the Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act – originally introduced by then-Senator Obama and now in its fifth year on Capitol Hill – and the inelegantly named Better Evaluation and Treatment Through Essential Regulatory Reform for Patient Care Act.

The prudent approach – particularly for companies, investors and consumers with an interest in DTC genetic testing regulation – is to assume that some type of regulatory reform is coming to the industry. Unfortunately, important details like “what regulation” and “when will it arrive” continue to remain elusive.

Beyond: A Delicate Balancing Act. Assuming that lawmakers and regulators do decide to develop a formal DTC regulatory regime, the details will be a long time in coming. Stakeholder input will be crucial, and the rapidly changing scientific and commercial landscape will continue to pose a challenge for slower-moving lawmakers and regulators.

Despite all of this uncertainty, it is yet possible to identify (i) several key areas of relative consensus for any prospective DTC regulatory framework and (ii) some of the most pressing areas of dispute that must be resolved in order to proceed.

The First Step: Defining DTC. Before we get to areas of consensus and dispute, however, a brief word about definitions. Any formal regulatory framework will need to set out a clear definition of what, exactly, constitutes a “direct-to-consumer genetic test.” As the personal genomics industry has grown increasingly diverse, the application of the label “DTC” to all consumer-oriented genetic products has become increasingly untenable.

There are, at the moment, at least three different types of DTC genetic tests:

• tests marketed to consumers but ordered and interpreted by a healthcare provider;
• tests marketed to and ordered by consumers but received and interpreted by or only in the presence of a healthcare provider; and
• tests marketed to, ordered by and received by consumers without any requirement that a healthcare provider be involved (although this option is frequently made available to consumers).

While the focus has frequently been on the third and most consumer-oriented type of genetic test, not all so-called DTC genetic testing companies fall into this category. This is significant since the risks – whether hypothetical or actual – of “DTC genetic testing,” as well as the appropriate regulatory response, clearly depend in large part on what exactly is meant by that term.

Finding Common Ground. Although few in number, it appears that consensus is emerging in certain areas pertaining to DTC genetic testing.

Access to Raw Data. Even those who strongly support the robust regulation of DTC genetic testing, agree that individuals should have the right to directly access their raw genetic data (pdf). In public and private comments, the FDA has appeared to embrace this position as well, indicating it is medical claims or interpretations – and not genetic information per se – that concerns the agency.

We need to be careful, however, to define exactly what this outbreak of agreement covers. Although important for what it says about an individual’s right to access their own genome, it likely refers only to the most basic level of access – a large file of As, Cs, Ts and Gs – and to nothing more. This is only a first step. Meaningful “access” for the vast majority of individuals begins only with the ability to access interpreted data.

Registration and Truth in Advertising. As the recent GAO report laid plain, there is a clear need for more robust regulation of the advertising and marketing practices of existing genetic testing companies, including DTC companies, to ensure consumers are not being intentionally or even accidentally misled.

Addressing this issue requires a thorough understanding of the tests currently offered to consumers, including how they are marketed or advertised, how they are intended to be used, and how they are actually used. The FDA has acknowledged several times in public discussions, including yesterday, that the agency lacks this information and that it would be useful in developing appropriate regulations.

While there remains some disagreement over the proper agency or agencies to collect this information and to take appropriate enforcement actions where necessary (the FDA and the FTC have both demonstrated some interest, and the NIH is currently developing a genetic testing registry), there is widespread agreement that these steps should be taken, and soon.

Industry-Wide Standards. Finally, almost since the inception of DTC genetic testing in 2007, there has been a widespread recognition that the industry would benefit from a more standardized approach to interpreting and reporting genetic data.

Early efforts led by the Personalized Medicine Coalition to produce industry-developed standards have stalled, but the inconsistency demonstrated by Collins, Venter et al. and most recently the GAO report have resulted in renewed interest from industry and regulators in addressing this issue.

Here, again, it is important to acknowledge the limited scope of this consensus. There is real agreement that standards are needed. The development and application of those standards, however, raises a host of questions, some of which are discussed below, to which there are hardly consensus answers.

Resolving Disputes. Beyond the few but important areas of consensus described above, it is certain that any emerging regulatory framework will have to tackle numerous difficult questions about which there is a decided lack of agreement. While it is impossible to list all of the areas of disagreement, some of the most pressing issues are:

• whether genetic tests should ever be offered directly to consumers without the involvement of a trained intermediary such as a physician or genetic counselor (i.e., should the third type of DTC genetic testing described above disappear);
• whether to create separate standards for non-clinical genetic tests, including genetic ancestry testing, and how to appropriately define the line between clinical and non-clinical tests;
• how to regulate genetic tests or products that include a large number of interpretations and claims in light of the need to constantly update those claims to best reflect current scientific understanding;
• whether clinical utility, or lack thereof, should be included in determining whether a particular genetic test or association is made available, whether DTC or otherwise;
• how to regulate interpretative tools that do not involve any new testing, but simply offer additional interpretations of raw genetic data already in a consumer’s possession;
• how to address the role of preliminary scientific findings and research in the development of interpretive tools, including genetic tests; and
• whether to focus regulatory efforts on pre-test measures that restrict the availability of potentially harmful genetic tests or post-test initiatives designed to evaluate how consumers perceive, use and react to genetic tests.

The answers to these questions and others, as well as the role industry, consumers and healthcare providers are permitted to play in the conversation, will determine the substance of any forthcoming DTC regulatory framework.

Answering Mary’s Question: To Test or Not To Test? While tomorrow always carries the possibility of a new and clearer day for the regulation of DTC genetic testing, the reality is that, for the moment, all we can say for sure is that the conversation is continuing. What was true in 2006 is still true today: genetic tests are available for purchase directly by consumers, and the regulatory requirements imposed on the companies that offer those tests are unclear and seemingly poised to shift at a moment’s notice.

As I have written several times before, I am optimistic about the long-term prospects for personal genomics in the United States, including DTC genetic testing. As the underlying technology and science continue to improve, the price and value of individual-level genomic data will continue to move in opposite directions, generating increased demand. In time, as increasing demand leads to increasing accessibility and, ultimately, to increasing familiarity – on the part of both consumers and regulators – the development of a tailored system of oversight that permits direct access while adequately protecting consumer safety and ensuring the accuracy and validity of DTC products can be developed.

But none of this will happen overnight. For all of our own interest, DTC genetic testing remains decidedly a niche phenomenon, and the industry poses novel and difficult challenges to regulators. It will take time for these to be ironed out and, in the short-term, it is possible that DTC genetic testing will be presented with a substantially more restrictive regulatory framework than at present.

Ultimately, while I cannot advise Mary Carmichael as to whether she should or should not go through with a DTC genetic test – that’s a personal decision – I can say that if she decides to proceed there is no time like today, for there is no guarantee that the option will still be on the table tomorrow.

_______________

¹The regulation of DTC genetic testing is far from uniform at the international level. Some countries, including Germany, appear to have effectively legislated DTC genetic testing out of existence, at least for the time being. Elsewhere, most notably the U.K., the conversation remains at the level of voluntary guidelines instead of formal – or even informal – regulation. Recent examples include the 2009 House of Lords report on genomic medicine and yesterday’s publication by the Human Genetics Commission of “A Common Framework of Principles for direct-to-consumer genetic testing services” (pdf).

In letters dated July 19th, the first day of the FDA’s public LDT meeting, the Agency continued its crackdown on direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic test providers, mailing letters to 14 providers of genetic tests. A list of all 14 companies and tests appears below.

The Letters. The letters are similar to the five untitled “letters to industry” the FDA sent out in early June to 23andMe, Navigenics, deCODE Genetics, Knome and Illumina. While briefer than the earlier letters, the new batch of letters reach the same conclusion: each of the companies is marketing a genetic test that, according to the FDA, meets the definition of a “device” under Section 201(h) of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). Therefore, each test must receive FDA clearance (510(k)) or approval (PMA). Not surprisingly, the FDA “conducted a review of [its] files” but was “unable to identify any [such FDA] clearance or approval” for any of the tests. The companies are asked to respond to the FDA within 15 days.

By comparison, the June 10th DTC letters were lengthier and also contained (1) information regarding the specific devices/products identified as problematic by the FDA, (2) a recitation of the FDA’s authority for premarket regulation of medical devices under the FFDCA and (3) a description, in most cases, of a prior meeting between the company and the FDA. The June 10th letters also urged the companies to “take prompt action to respond” to the letter, instead of setting out a definite timeframe.

The other notable difference between the two sets of FDA letters is who signed them. The June 10th letters were signed by Dr. Alberto Gutierrez, Director of the FDA’s Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation and Safety (OIVD). The July 19th letters, on the other hand, were signed by OIVD Deputy Director James Woods. It appears that over the last month OIVD and Dr. Gutierrez have gained sufficient comfort with their letter-writing campaign to push the task down the chain of command.

The Tests. Here is the list of all 14 companies who received FDA letters dated July 19th:

• Graceful Earth Inc. Concerning the Graceful Earth Alzheimer’s Test
• SeqWright DNA Technology Services, Inc. Concerning the SeqWright Genomic Profiling Service (GPS)
• Interleukin Genetics, Inc. Concerning the Inerent [sic] Health
• DNATraits Concerning the Ashkenazi Jews Genetic Disease Panel
• CyGene Direct™ Concerning the Metabolic Health Assessment DNA Analysis Test
• Consumer Genetics, LLC Concerning the AsthmaGEN DNA Test
• Matrix Genomics, Inc. Concerning the Matrix Genomics Breast Cancer Panel
• The Genetic Testing Laboratories, Inc. Concerning The Genetic Testing Laboratories DNA Predisposition Test
• Sequenom, Inc. Concerning the SEQureDx™
• EnteroLab Reference Laboratory Concerning the Gene Test for Gluten Sensitivity/Celiac Sprue
• BioMarker Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Concerning the Gene Essence™
• DNA Dimensions Concerning the Predisposition DNA Test
• HealthCheckUSA Concerning the HealthCheckUSA Celiac Disease DNA Test
• easyDNA Concerning the Genetic Predisposition Health Test

Most but not all of these tests appear to be offered for sale directly to consumers. All appear to be marketed DTC. For some tests it can be difficult to tell. For instance, while Matrix Genomics’ breast cancer test can be purchased directly online, I was unable to find a way to order DNA Dimensions’ “Concerning the Predisposition” test through the company’s website, although the company does have a Facebook page. Other products, such as Sequenom’s SEQureDx™ test which, according to the FDA (pdf), measures “circulating cell-free fetal (ccff) nucleic acids (RNA or DNA) in a pregnant woman’s blood sample for fetal gene and chromosome abnormalities, do not appear to be available for purchase without a physician’s involvement.

The range of tests and test providers makes it impossible to determine why or how the FDA selected these particular tests for the current round of letters. Matrix Genomics, for instance, also offers Alzheimer’s, Heart Attack, Warfarin, Plavix and Parkinson’s tests. The FDA’s letter, however, only mentioned its breast cancer panel. And even with these 14 additional letters, as I wrote last time, there are still dozens – and possibly more – of genetic tests marketed and sold directly to consumers that have not been identified by the FDA. The Genetic and Public Policy Center’s (GPPC) recently updated chart of DTC genetic testing companies (pdf) lists 30 companies, and similar lists from AccessDNA and DNA Test Index include dozens more.

What’s more, as with the case of Sequenom, it’s not clear that the test is being offered directly to consumers. If that’s the case, and the FDA has moved on from sending letters to DTC genetic testing providers to sending letters to providers of more traditional LDTs, then the FDA has thousands of potential letter recipients to choose from at GeneTests.org. [Update: Kirell Lakhman of GenomeWeb's The Sample writes that Sequenom was the only non-DTC genetic test maker of the 14 and, what's more, "Sequenom hasn't even begun selling the assay. In fact, the company is still collecting clinical samples for studies..."]

More than a month after the first five DTC letters went out, and in the immediate aftermath of the FDA’s public meeting, companies, consumers, healthcare providers, investors and the general public remain largely in the dark about the factors the FDA is using to determine which tests and test providers to target. Is it a test’s intended use? The fact that it is marketed DTC? The fact that it is sold DTC? The complexity of a particular test? The perceived or actual lack of analytical validity, clinical validity and/or clinical utility? Any or all of those factors, as well as numerous others, might be influencing the FDA’s activity in this area. Until the FDA offers up a general policy for public review – and hopefully for comment as well – there is no way for anyone outside of the Agency to know where the FDA might be headed next. For the moment, at least, it appears that company-by-company, test-by-test letter mailing continues to be the Agency’s preferred approach.

The Timing. During the FDA’s two-day public meeting earlier this week, the Agency repeatedly emphasized that its policy with respect to the regulation of LDTs – including DTC genetic tests – had not been finalized. That was, after all, one of the primary purposes of the meeting: to “serve as a forum to discuss issues and stakeholder concerns surrounding LDT oversight.” The meeting even included an entire session devoted to DTC testing, in which participants were invited to discuss the risks and benefits of DTC genetic tests.

On the topic of the FDA’s willingness to listen to the LDT community, here is what I wrote after the first day of the meeting.

Openness. One reason that a fully articulated regulatory policy is unlikely to emerge from the FDA in short order is that the Agency appears strongly committed to gathering stakeholder input and developing regulations that respond to that input. This is a standard talking point for any regulatory agency, and with numerous conflicting opinions over whether and how the FDA should regulate LDTs, it is obvious that the Agency will not satisfy every stakeholder. Still, I was struck by the Agency’s commitment—in both private and public conversations—to understanding the issues and keeping an open mind about how to proceed. There seemed no reason to doubt Dr. Mansfield when she said that when it comes to LDT regulation, “nothing is set in stone; we have not made any decisions.” This only serves to underscore the importance of participation in the regulatory process which, if attendance at this meeting is any indication, is a strategy that the LDT community has embraced. (emphasis added)

The July 19th letters certainly seem to give the lie to the Agency’s position, including Dr. Mansfield’s comments, that nothing is set in stone when it comes to LDT regulation.

The FDA’s policy with respect to DTC genetic tests, while far from clear, certainly seems to be moving ahead unchanged, public meeting or no. The timing of the letters, which were mailed the same day as the meeting began, suggest that the FDA had no intention of revisiting its decision to step up oversight of DTC genetic tests, no matter what might have been said on Monday and Tuesday.

So what are we to make of the timing of the timing of the FDA letters?

On the one hand, as was pointed out by the Agency after the previous round of letters, these are untitled “letters to industry” and are less severe than a formal FDA “warning letter.” The letters identify Agency concerns and give the named companies time to respond. (Depending on the response, or lack thereof, the FDA may follow up with warning letters down the road.) The letters also subject other lesser-known DTC companies to FDA scrutiny similar to that received by the companies named in the June 10th letters, although, as mentioned above, that level of scrutiny is hardly industry-wide at this point. It is possible that the FDA is slowly but surely identifying DTC (and select other) genetic tests that it believes are particularly problematic, and mailing out standardized letters as it does so. It is possible that the timing is largely coincidental.

On the other hand, coincidence or not, it is difficult to believe that the timing of the FDA’s latest letters won’t provide significant fuel for those who believe that the Agency has already made up its mind about how it intends to regulate LDTs – including DTC genetic tests – and that the two-day public meeting was simply window dressing to help bolster the Agency’s defense against any future challenges to its soon-to-be-enacted regulatory policy.

While I continue to think that the FDA is indeed listening to the LDT community as it develops its regulatory strategy – if for no other reason than that the topic is so complex that the FDA is unlikey to sort out all of the details quickly, or on its own – this latest development gives me pause. One of the many themes that emerged over the two-day public meeting was that the FDA will need assistance and buy-in from regulated parties in order to effectively implement its new system of LDT oversight, whatever it may be. Allowing those stakeholders to have a say in the development of the FDA’s regulatory policy is an excellent way to secure that assistance and buy-in; but that strategy only works if the FDA can convince the LDT community that it is actually listening. Coincidental or not, the timing of this round of FDA letters is unlikely to help the Agency in that regard.

What’s Next. Three of the five companies named in the June 10th letters will be on Capitol Hill first thing tomorrow morning for a House of Representatives hearing on “Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing and the Consequences to the Public Health.” The House Committee on Energy and Commerce posted a briefing memo (pdf) for the hearing earlier today. The memo provides additional background information (including information about the GAO investigation, which apparently was initiated all the way back in March 2009) and includes a witness list.

In addition to representatives from Pathway Genomics, 23andMe and Navigenics, the GAO and FDA will be represented. Dr. James Evans of UNC-Chapel Hill, and a member of the SACGHS, will also testify. For those interested in following the hearings from afar, Andro Hsu has posted a link to a live webcast that will, hopefully, be active once the hearings begin.

None of the 14 companies recently named by the FDA have been invited to appear before the House, but that’s no guarantee that Congress won’t invite some or all of them to take their own trip to Washington at some future date.

Below, we will discuss the immediate and long-term implications of the FDA’s most recent regulatory actions for the five companies receiving letters, as well as for the DTC genetic testing industry. First, however, a review of the letters themselves is required. Each of the five two-page letters is signed by Alberto Gutierrez, Director of the FDA’s Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation and Safety (OIVD), and follows a similar format throughout. To gauge the impact of these letters we will take them paragraph by paragraph.

1. The Devices in Question. Each letter begins with a description of the product the FDA has determined qualifies as a device under Section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). Section 201(h)(2) of the FDCA defines “device” as:

an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory, which is…intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals

The agency’s letter focuses in on the second half of the 201(h)(2) definition, and adds in language from 201(h)(3) which allows the FDA to categorize products as a device if they are “intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man.” The “devices” identified by the FDA are: 23andMe Personal Genome Service™, Navigenics Health Compass, deCODEme Complete Scan, KnomeComplete™ and the Illumina® Infinium HumanHapp 550 array. It’s difficult to see how any of these products would fall under 201(h)(3) but not 201(h)(2) but, regardless, the FDA is making a clear statement: based on the plain language of the FDCA, it considers these products to be medical devices.

2. Has Your Doctor Seen This? The second paragraph, which appears to be identical in every letter, is a generic overview of the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the FDCA. The MDA grants the FDA the authority to require premarket regulation of medical devices. The letter stresses the importance of demonstrating both analytical and clinical validity to ensure that “individuals are not misled by incorrect test results or unsupported clinical interpretations” and that the products are “used to support good healthcare decisions.”

We wrote earlier this week about the difference between analytical and clinical validity, and the role that CLIA (which is administered by CMS, not the FDA) is meant to play in ensuring the former. The letters clearly indicate that the FDA has its eye on both measurements of genetic test quality, as it should. More significantly, the letters appear to indicate that the agency considers the products in question to provide “clinical interpretations” and/or to be used in “healthcare decisions.” In the long-running debate over whether DTC genetic testing qualifies as clinical medicine, it appears that the FDA may have come down on the clinical side of the fence, at least for these particular products.

In fact, Director Gutierrez clarified this point in an interview this afternoon with Newsweek. Director Gutierrez seemed particularly concerned with products that report on genetic variants related to drug metabolization:

If you’re making a claim about [a genetic variant that affects the metabolism of the anticoagulant drug] warfarin, and somebody decides based on the result they get that they want to change their dosing, that is a fairly risky decision. That could affect their health. If they’re not feeling well on their current dose and the drug is expensive, we don’t know what they would do.

These concerns are reiterated, albeit in less detail, in several of the actual letters (see next paragraph).

3. Where’s the Approval? The third paragraph in four of the five letters informs the company that the FDA has not received any information pertaining to the analytical or clinical validity of the products for use in the FDA’s “clearance or approval” of the products. The letters go on to describe the type of genetic information provided by the companies that is of particular concern in this regard, for example the warfarin and clopidogrel response information reported by 23andMe and Navigenics and the breast cancer risk and detection information provided by deCODE. The FDA, echoing Gutierrez’s comments above, warns that “consumers may make medical decisions in reliance on this information.”

The use of the word “consumer” is an interesting choice, particularly in light of the focus that the FDA is clearly placing on the potential clinical use of the products. It is particularly confusing in certain letters, 23andMe’s for instance, where the recipient of the genetic information is referred to in the same paragraph as both a “patient” and as a “consumer.” Clearly, one task for the future regulation and description of genetic testing products will be to clean up the terminology.

It’s also important to point out that Illumina receives special treatment in this paragraph. Of all the companies receiving letters, Illumina is the only one not to offer at least one product directly to consumers (the company does offer a commercial whole-genome sequencing service, although that product requires the participation of a healthcare professional). Illumina’s letter notes that the company has “received FDA clearance or approval for several of its devices,” but not for the HumanHap550 array. “Yet Illumina is knowingly providing the HumanHap550 array to 23andMe and deCODE Genetics for clinical diagnostic use without FDA clearance or approval” despite its being labeled “For Research Use Only.” As Gutierrez notes, “…Illumina has to follow the law, and they are aware that the chips are not being used for research only.”

Again, it appears that the FDA’s determination that the products are being used for clinical diagnostic purposes and delivered directly to consumers appear to be important factors, with the FDA drawing no enforcement distinction between enabling DTC genetic testing and providing the DTC genetic tests themselves.

4. We Know What You Said Last Summer. All but one of the letters then go on to describe a meeting last summer between the company in question and the FDA (July 29th for 23andMe, July 31st for Illumina, August 6th for Knome and August 13th for deCODE.) Surprisingly, there is no mention of a Navigenics / FDA meeting although, in part due to this paragraph’s conspicuous absence from the Navigenics letter, I wonder if this may have been an inadvertent omission.

During these summer meetings the companies presented information about their products to the FDA. On the basis of that information, as well as other available information (e.g., the FDA notes that 23andMe has “recently begun distributing the collection kit for your device through a third party distributor, Amazon.com”), the FDA has concluded that the products in question are diagnostic devices subject to FDCA regulation.

In its letters to 23andMe, Knome and deCODE, the agency goes on to explain that, since the products are “not developed by and used in a single laboratory,” it does not consider them to qualify as laboratory developed tests (LDTs). This is an important point because the FDA has long exercised “enforcement discretion” over LDTs, choosing generally not to regulate this category of test, one which includes a majority of currently available genetic tests. Since so many genetic test providers – not just those of the DTC variety – have relied on the LDT determination as a basis for skirting FDA regulation, this section in particular is likely to raise the blood pressure for companies that purport to offer one or more LDTs but do not conduct all of their development, testing and interpretation in house.

5. Where is Your Letter? Next is a paragraph, nearly identical across all five letters, that reminds the companies they have not received what FDA believes to be the necessary regulatory approvals. Or, as the agency puts it, “we are not aware that you have an approved application for premarket approval (PMA) in effect pursuant to” the FDCA, nor have you “notified the agency of your intent to introduce the device into commercial distribution as required by section 510(k)” of the FDCA.

Briefly, the FDA regulates medical devices in three classes.

Class I devices are simple devices that pose a minimal risk, and are generally exempt from FDA premarket approval or clearance. However, registration of the device is required (as is true of all FDA regulated devices).

Class II devices represent an intermediate level of risk, and require regulatory clearance (as opposed to an “approval”) before they can be sold in commerce. The FDA must determine that the “device to be marketed is as safe and effective, that is, substantially equivalent (SE), to a legally marketed device not subject to premarket approval.” The clearance track for Class II devices is set forth in section 510(k) of the FDCA.

Class III devices are the riskiest device class, and the products that receive the most stringent FDA scrutiny. FDA approval is required before the device can be sold in commerce, and is granted only when the FDA determines that there is “sufficient valid scientific evidence…that the device is safe and effective for its intended use.” The regulatory submission is substantially more detailed than under 510(k), and the FDA is not obligated to respond as quickly.

The FDA letters provide no real insight into whether the agency considers the products it has identified to represent Class I, Class II or Class III devices, a classification that will determine the size of the regulatory burden imposed by the FDA.

6. We Will Be Waiting. Finally, the FDA advises each company to “take prompt action to respond to this letter” and offers to meet with the company to “discuss whether there are tests you are promoting that do not require review by FDA…”

“Prompt” is not defined, and most or all of these companies have had open channels of communication with the FDA for some time now, so it is unclear what type of timetable this imposes. It is clear, however, that this is an invitation to further agency dialogue, and that these companies decline only at their peril.

The second part of the paragraph – the agency’s offer to “discuss whether there are tests you are promoting that do not require review by FDA” – strikes us as a possible opening, at least for some of the identified companies and tests. Last fall, 23andMe, following in the footsteps of its competitor (and recent FDA regulatory target) Pathway Genomics, announced that it was breaking up its genetic testing service so that it could offer separate products for customers seeking to explore their genetic ancestry but who were not interested in the more medical applications of personal genetics, or vice versa. (23andMe also offers a combined product that includes all of those features). As I wrote at the time, that is just the sort of distinction that might be significant to the FDA as the companies and the agency discuss which specific products require premarket clearance and approval (more on this below).

What Does It Mean For the Five Named Companies? The immediate implications of the FDA’s letters may be less significant than some might initially suspect. After years of speculation about whether and how the FDA would regulate DTC genetic testing products, the agency has now publicly delivered at least a partial answer: it considers these specific products to be medical devices requiring either premarket clearance or approval, and it does not consider them to be LDTs subject to regulatory enforcement discretion.

For the companies named in the letters, at least, this provides a concrete agency determination to which they can react. It’s unlikely that the response from any of the companies will be to pull their products completely off of the market and, as The New York Times reports, Director Gutierrez has indicated that “it would be unfair to remove the tests from the market because the agency had not, until now, clearly told the companies that the devices needed approval.”

[Added in Edit, 6/11: Turna Ray of Pharmacogenomics Reporter has published her own recap, which contains additional comments from Erica Jefferson, an FDA press officer. Jefferson's comments make a point of distinguishing the five untitled "letters to industry" from "warning letters." Jefferson explained the difference between the two types of letters:

While Warning Letters set out specific violations of law that a company must address immediately or else the agency will take an enforcement action, an Untitled Letter identifies agency concerns and gives a company the opportunity to meet with the agency and to have time to take appropriate steps to address these concerns...Based on how the companies respond to the Untitled Letters, FDA may follow up by sending Warning Letters.

Jefferson also added that the letters were sent based in part on recent discussions between the FDA and several of the companies that took place in the aftermath of the FDA's decision to send Pathway Genomics a similar letter last month. According to Jefferson, those meetings "helped inform the agency's decision to send the Untitled Letters." End Edit, 6/11]

So, at least for the moment, we may see little or no immediate change while these companies weigh their options internally and through discussions with the FDA. What exactly are those options? They obviously vary based on the specific company and product, but here are a few of the most likely possibilities:

Wave Goodbye. For products that have failed to meet expectations, or are no longer an integral part of the company’s future plans, one possibility is to simply pull the product from the market. The most likely candidate for this response would appear to be the deCODEme test, which is considerably more expensive and less popular than a number of its competitors. deCODE Genetics recently emerged from a well-publicized bankruptcy, and there have been hints that deCODEme might not be part of the reorganized company’s long-term plans. (However, in comments today to The New York Times, neither deCODE or its head of research, Kari Stefansson, indicated that they would do anything other than cooperate with the FDA). If deCODE or any other company does decide to pull its test from the market, existing customers will likely be anxious to know what will happen with their genetic data.

Say Hello (to the FDA). For other companies (e.g., Illumina, a company with considerable experience navigating the FDA approval process), the path of least resistance may be to simply agree with the FDA and seek the appropriate clearance or approval. The viability of this option will depend on how the FDA intends to categorize the specific product (e.g., Class I, II or III) and whether the company believes (a) it can bear the burden imposed by such a regulatory submission and (b) that its product will be approved without changes to its substance or commercial availability that would materially undermine the product’s commercial viability.

Change Pathways. Perhaps the most palatable option for many of these companies is to consider altering the product in a manner that would convince the FDA it no longer qualifies as a device requiring premarket approval or clearance, for instance by removing the ability of consumers to purchase the product without the participation of a healthcare provider.

In his interview with Newsweek, Director Gutierrez discloses that Pathway Genomics was not sent a letter yesterday because the company responded to the agency’s previous letter and has indicated that “they are planning to move away from direct-to-consumer testing…” While that disclosure is news to me, and not one I believe the company has made publicly (the website still appears to allow consumers to purchase directly), it is not a surprising one. As Gutierrez notes, another genetic testing company, Counsyl, made a similar decision in the aftermath of the Pathway / Walgreens commotion.

Of the five companies that received FDA letters this week, Navigenics and Knome would appear to be the most likely candidates to pursue this option. Navigenics has increasingly shifted its product focus over the past year in the direction of more traditional medical channels (as evidenced by its receipt earlier this year of a clinical laboratory permit from the State of New York, apparently the first awarded to a personal genomics provider), and this development could be the final nudge it needs to pull the plug on its DTC option. Similarly, Knome, which once offered whole-genome sequencing directly to the super-rich for $350,000, has increasingly positioned itself as a provider of genomic software and interpretation, with a focus on research and clinical applications. As with Navigenics, if Knome can forestall FDA regulation by eliminating all DTC versions of its products, it may have a strong incentive to do so.

A related approach, discussed above, would be for companies to seek different regulatory treatment for products that have clearly different uses. 23andMe, for instance, might seek a different classification for its ancestry testing product as compared to its products that provide genetic testing of a more arguably medical variety, such as disease prediction or drug response.

Prepare for War.  Finally, there’s always the possibility that one or more of the companies will challenge the FDA’s determination that they are either (a) offering a medical device or (b) not offering an LDT. There’s no question that going toe-to-toe with the FDA represents the path of greatest resistance, but if any of these companies feel sufficiently backed into a corner by the FDA’s approach this could surface as a viable option.

While no company has yet indicated its intent to challenge the FDA’s interpretation, 23andMe has thus far been the most outspoken in its criticism of the agency’s recent actions. As reported by The New York Times, one 23andMe director suggested that denying consumers direct access to their genetic information would be “appallingly paternalistic” (a characterization Director Gutierrez found inapplicable to the FDA’s regulatory decision), and the company has indicated that it “disagree[s] with the FDA’s conclusion” but is “open to discussion on ways to regulate the personal genetics industry.” Only time will tell whether 23andMe, or some other party, attempts to challenge the FDA’s regulatory approach to DTC genetic testing.

What Does it Mean for the Rest of the DTC Genetic Testing Industry? For the rest of the industry, the regulatory outlook is little clearer today than it was yesterday. The FDA has offered specific regulatory determinations for a limited set of DTC genetic testing products, but it has not offered broader industry guidance.

From the letters, and from Director Gutierrez’s statements, it is clear enough that the agency considered several important factors in identifying these five specific companies and products as regulatory targets. These include the DTC availability of the product (or, in the case of Illumina, contribution to DTC availability), the perceived medical use of the product and, in all likelihood, the complexity of the testing and interpretation involved in the product.

But how the FDA weighed those factors against others – including the utility of the tests, the reality of its limited regulatory resources, and the presence of numerous other genetic tests offered to consumers and to patients – remains unclear. Keep in mind that the FDA sent letters to five companies that, while they represent some of the best known genetic testing providers, do not comprise the entire DTC genetic testing industry (see, for example, this list at DNA Test Index or this list at AccessDNA). For other DTC companies, as well as companies and investors seeking to break into the DTC marketplace, there continues to be a lack of clarity into the FDA’s DTC genetic testing regulatory strategy.

For that reason and others, my own opinion continues to be that transparency – and not regulation – is what would be most beneficial to the DTC genetic testing industry and its customers at this time. Until companies, consumers and regulators better understand the tests that are available and, importantly, how those tests are being used, it will be difficult to develop a regulatory policy that protects the health and safety of individuals without stifling commercial innovation and individual exploration. In the meantime, expect the FDA’s latest actions – as well as, possibly, the ongoing Congressional investigation – to significantly shake up the personal genomics landscape in the coming weeks and months.

According to an MSNBC story, the FDA sent a letter to Pathway “asking the test maker to show it has regulatory approval, or prove why [the test] should be sold without the agency’s blessing.” In response, Walgreens is “elect[ing] not to move forward with offering the Pathway product to our customers until we have further clarity on this matter.”

Back to the Drawing Board. Despite its obvious significance, it is hard to be surprised by this latest development. When the Director of the FDA’s Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation and Safety (OIVD) tells The Washington Post that you would be selling an “illegally marketed device” if you proceed as intended, you should know the letter is already in the mail and retreat to the drawing board as quickly as possible.

The real question is what happens next. For years the FDA has been watching the development of the DTC genetic testing industry from the sidelines. No longer. But what we don’t know is just how extensive a regulatory push the FDA is planning to make.

According to MSNBC, the FDA letter, which was signed by the Deputy Director of OIVD, considers Pathway’s “Genetic Health Report…to meet the definition of a device as that term is defined in section 201(h) of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act.”

Section 201(h)(2) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) defines “device” as:

an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory, which is…intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals

That definition covers a lot of ground, but what it almost certainly does not cover is a saliva collection kit on its own (without more, that’s just a means of collecting and storing saliva), which is all that Pathway Genomics was actually planning to place on Walgreens’ shelves. Although I have not seen the full text of the FDA’s letter the excerpted sections strongly suggest that the FDA is focusing its regulatory attention on Pathway’s actual genetic test and its subsequent interpretation of the test results, and not on the fact that Pathway was opening up a new distribution channel for those tests. [See subsequent GLR post for analysis of additional comments from the FDA. The FDA has also made its letter to Pathway Genomics public.]

Industry-Wide Regulation? If that is in fact the case, it’s difficult to see other DTC genetic testing companies escaping increased regulatory scrutiny. As we’ve written several times previously, apart from the matter of visibility, Pathway’s tests appear to be highly similar, both in terms of what they test and how they present the results, to the tests offered by other DTC genetic testing companies. It would come as no surprise to find out that the FDA has sent similar letters to other DTC genetic testing companies, or will in the coming days and weeks. [Update: The New York Times reports that this is exactly what has been happening.] In fact, the only outcome that would surprise me here is if the FDA focused its regulatory attention exclusively on Pathway, while ignoring its competitors.

It should be added that, at least for the moment, all the FDA has done is backed up several public comments that suggest it believes Pathway is on the wrong side of the law with a formal letter requesting more information from the company. That letter also leaves a window, however small, for Pathway to “prove why [the test] should be sold without the agency’s blessing.” Pathway, for its part, continues to claim that it can sell its products without FDA approval because they are “not intended for use in diagnosis, treatment or for the mitigation or cure of a disease,” and therefore fall outside of the FFDCA’s definition of a device.

Will the FDA buy that argument? If it does not, and the agency decides to regulate DTC genetic tests, what will those regulations look like? Will it require Pathway – and other DTC genetic test providers – to pull tests from shelves and websites until they can be reviewed and approved by the FDA, or will there be some manner of regulatory transition period designed to minimize disruption to an industry that is still in its early stages?

A Challenge for the FDA. Despite the flurry of activity over the past few days, the FDA’s regulatory policy with respect to DTC genetic testing leaves us with far more questions than answers.

It has long seemed inevitable that the FDA would regulate DTC genetic tests in some fashion. Indeed, as Turna Ray reported today in Pharmacogenomics Reporter, many of Pathway’s peers have indicated that they would welcome federal regulation:

23andMe, Navigenics, and Decode have all indicated they would welcome more federal guidance for the DTC genomics industry. Particularly after New York and California decided to regulate certain firms two years ago, industry leaders from DTC genomics firms noted that they prefer to have more overarching and definitive guidance from federal health regulators than have to deal with authorities on a state-by-state basis.

The fact that the FDA is finally tackling the regulation of DTC genetic tests is not a problem per se for the industry. But it could quickly become one. To avoid this, what is needed from the FDA is a clear set of guidelines, provided in a timely fashion, that address the agency’s concerns without unduly burdening an industry that is still trying to establish itself. That’s quite a challenge for an agency not always known for its promptness or clarity. DTC companies, customers and commentators will all be anxiously watching to see if the FDA is up to the task.

Turns out we only needed to wait a week – not a decade – for the landscape to shift again. Earlier today, DTC provider Pathway Genomics announced that it was partnering with drugstore giant Walgreens to offer its genetic testing service through most of that chain’s 7,500 stores.

Is Walgreens the Tipping Point for Personal Genomics Regulation? At first blush, this might appear to be nothing more than a creative product partnership between a fledgling personal genomics company and a giant drugstore chain. As it turns out, there are early indications that the Pathway/Walgreens partnership could turn out to be a tipping point in the regulation of personal genomics.

With that in mind, and since this post is slightly longer than usual, here’s a quick roadmap for the remainder of this article:

I. Aisle 8: Spit Kits. Basic details about Pathway Genomics’ products and its partnership with Walgreens.

II. Location, Location, Location. Why this time it is the location of the product that matters, and not its price or its content.

III. Enter the Gatekeepers. Though this is not the first time concerns have been voiced about DTC genetic testing, the direct comments from an FDA official are particularly striking, and suggest that these concerns may be finally be ready to produce a regulatory response.

IV. The Regulation of DTC Genetic Testing. This section, and its two sub-sections: The FDA and LDTs and CLIA, Validity and Utility, provide a detailed but still high-level overview of the core components of federal genetic testing regulation, particularly as it pertains to DTC genetic testing. These sections are lengthy, and if you’re not interested in the nuts and bolts of genetic testing regulation you should feel free to skim or skip them.

V. Enforcement Discretion. An examination of the FDA’s decision to voluntarily refrain from regulating most genetic tests, and an overview of proposed regulations that would expand the FDA’s activities in this area.

VI. The Open Secret of DTC Medical Genetic Testing. A review of how certain DTC genetic testing companies attempt to distinguish between the provision of genetic information and medical genetic testing, and why that distinction is proving increasingly difficult to maintain.

VII. Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda. As established earlier, it is likely that the FDA could regulate DTC genetic tests more aggressively. This final section asks whether (a) the Pathway/Walgreens partnership will cause the FDA to exercise its dormant regulatory authority and (b) whether it should do so.

Aisle 8: Spit Kits. The details of the new Pathway/Walgreens partnership are slightly more complicated than walking into the drug store and walking out with a report summarizing your genetic variation. What Pathway is actually selling in the store is an Insight™ Saliva Collection Kit (or “spit kit,” as it is more colloquially known), which will retail for $20 to $30. That’s all that you can actually pull off of the shelf and carry out of the store.

The actual genetic analysis occurs only once the customer mails the spit kit to Pathway and heads online to purchase a specific service, at an additional fee. Those fees range from $79 (drug response) to $179 (either carrier testing or health and disease testing) all the way up to $249 for all three testing services in one package. (Interestingly, there is no information in the Pathway press release about the cost of obtaining Pathway’s Ancestry Report using the Walgreens pricing model.) Factoring in the cost of the spit kit, the total cost to the consumer looks to be, at most, $279 for Pathway’s full service. That would make it $150 cheaper than Pathway’s primary DTC competitor, 23andMe, whose similar product retails online for $429.

Location, Location, Location. Typically, newsworthy developments in consumer personal genomics relate to either the content or price of the service, along with periodic pieces reviewing the dire condition of the industry as a whole. This time, however, it is all about location. The fact that a genetic test (or, to be more precise, a saliva collection device that is a requisite first step in obtaining a genetic test) will be offered directly to consumers in a brick and mortar drugstore, and not exclusively online, is a development that is drawing an unexpected amount of attention. (Several publications, including GenomeWeb, have pointed out that this is not the first time a genetic test has been sold by a drugstore, although it is certainly the most widespread such collaboration.)

While most of the coverage of the Pathway announcement has been straightforward and fact-oriented, The Washington Post is one publication that sees this as a much bigger deal.

The over-the-counter test marks the first foray of personalized genomic medicine into the corner drugstore. The move is being welcomed by those who hope that deciphering the genetic code will launch a new era in biomedical science. But it’s being feared by those who worry it will open a Pandora’s box of confusion, privacy violations, genetic discrimination and other issues.

The Post goes on to quote respected Stanford University bioethicist Hank Greely, who calls the decision to offer Pathway’s tests directly in stores “reckless,” and Genetic Alliance director Sharon Terry, who doesn’t believe the test is “something people should be spending their money on yet.”

Of course, not everyone agrees that the migration of spit kits from websites to Walgreens is A Big Deal. Misha Angrist, in Chapter 38 of the Sky is Falling, suggests that the “only substantive difference in this case is that instead of going online, [consumers] go to the drugstore and possibly burn a few calories in the process.”

Mary Carmichael of Newsweek also wonders why The Post is so concerned by the Walgreens development. Carmichael theorizes that the worry is not “about this particular test, per se, but about the savvy way it’s being sold.” As has been well-documented, the market for DTC genetic tests is fairly small, particularly for tests focused on health and disease (as opposed to ancestry), such as several of the services offered by Pathway.

One likely reason for the failure of DTC genetic testing to reach large numbers of customers is that, for all of its advantages, online commerce takes place in a vast and unruly marketplace where it can be hard for new products to stand out, no matter how creative their advertising. By comparison, even the largest Walgreens is quite manageable, and Carmichael rightly points out that by appearing on the shelves of thousands of Walgreens across the country:

Pathway’s DTC genomic test will be the first one to reach a wide variety of people – including some who won’t have a lot of knowledge about genetics and who may not know how much stock to put in their test results. That’s what [The Washington Post, et al.] are so worried about.

The overriding concern voiced by those critical of the Pathway/Walgreens announcement, as Carmichael aptly notes, is that individuals consumers will not be capable of understanding and acting on the results of a genetic test without professional guidance.

Enter the Gatekeepers. That concern is not surprising, nor is it new. Whether individuals are capable of handling their own genetic information is a question that has attached itself to personal genomics since the outset (and one which The Post covered in some detail earlier this year). The debate has extended beyond consumer personal genomics to genomic research as well.

Not everybody is convinced that this is a real issue at this point. Misha Angrist sees

the panicked response to [the Pathway/Walgreens announcement] from doctors and academics as elitist: it assumes that the ordinary person is stupid and/or not entitled to his or her genetic information without a third-party ‘expert.’ Let’s be real: that ship sailed in 2007. (emphasis added)

While Angrist correctly points out that DTC genetic tests have been available since 2007 (Pathway’s test, which launched in 2009, was predated by similar offerings from 23andMe, deCODEme and Navigenics), this is one ship that just might be towed back into port.

For all of the rhetoric in The Post and elsewhere, here is the one comment that is truly newsworthy:

They are making medical claims. We don’t know whether the test works and whether patients are taking actions that could put them in jeopardy based on the test.

So said Alberto Gutierrez, Director of the FDA’s Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation and Safety, which makes it more than just another commentator’s opinion. Commentators’ concerns about the dangers of DTC genetic testing services are backed, they hope, by the force of evidence and reason. Regulators’ concerns, on the other hand, are backed by the force of civil and criminal penalties authorized by legislatures. As if to drive home that point, Gutierrez added “we think this would be an illegally marketed device if [Pathway Genomics] proceed[s].” It should be easy to figure out which comment DTC companies – and their lawyers – are paying closer attention to today.

Gutierrez’s comments to The Post, which were repeated in similar stories in Business Week and Chicago Breaking Business (which reports that the FDA has opened an investigation into Pathway Genomics), offer one of the strongest indications yet that, after several years of watching from the sidelines, federal regulators may be preparing to play a far greater role in shaping the business of direct-to-consumer genetic testing.

The Regulation of DTC Genetic Testing. Understanding the possibilities for increased regulation of genetic testing requires a review of the fairly complex current regulatory framework. Part of the complexity is in determining why and how certain types of genetic tests, including DTC genetic tests, are not presently regulated.

The Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society (SACGHS) provides the best background resource in this area. The SACGHS advises the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the umbrella agency that includes the FDA, CMS and the NIH, “on the broad range of human health and societal issues raised by the development and use and potential misuse of genetic technologies.” In that advisory capacity, in April of 2008 the SACGHS produced a 276-page report on “The U.S. System of Oversight of Genetic Testing” (pdf) that stands as the most comprehensive resource available to date. On the whole, the regulatory landscape for genetic testing providers shows considerable variation based on the nature of the test (e.g., disease testing vs. ancestry testing), the location at which the test is conducted (both the geographical and the regulatory status of the facility performing the test) and the nature (e.g., physician vs. patient vs. consumer) and geographical location of the individual ordering the test.

The FDA and LDTs. As it pertains to DTC genetic testing companies specifically, the most salient feature of the SACGHS report was likely the reminder that the FDA, which is tasked with interpreting and enforcing the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), has repeatedly asserted that it has the authority to regulate genetic tests, pursuant to its authority to regulate medical devices under the FFDCA.¹ While some have questioned in the past whether the FDA actually has jurisdiction over genetic tests (pdf), any attempt to forestall increased regulation by attacking FDA jurisdiction is probably a dead letter given the strong statutory presumption in favor of FDA jurisdiction.²

At present, whether a genetic test is subject to FDA regulation largely depends on how it is developed and marketed. The literature, as well as current FDA regulatory policy, divides genetic tests into two primary categories:

(i) in vitro diagnostic test kits³ (also sometimes referred to as IVD kits or, simply, as genetic test kits), which may be sold by their manufacturers directly to consumers, testing laboratories, clinicians or other approved recipients, depending on the device; and

(ii) laboratory developed tests (or LDTs, also sometimes referred to as “home brew” assays), which are not sold directly to the general public or to physicians; rather, a testing service (as opposed to the actual test itself) is marketed, and samples (e.g., of saliva) are collected and submitted to the laboratory for evaluation.

The FDA regulates IVD kits as medical devices subject to FDA’s standard medical device regulatory regime, which involves an inquiry into both the analytical and clinical performance of regulated devices.⁴

However, the majority of current genetic tests – and almost all new DTC genetic tests – are developed as LDTs and are much more lightly regulated. Currently, LDTs are subject to the FDA regulatory scheme that applies to medical devices (including IVD kits) only if they contain FDA-regulated analyte specific reagents (ASRs).⁵ Most ASRs are Class I devices under the FDA’s regulations, and therefore subject only to general controls, not to premarket approval or other special controls. However, when tests are regulated as Class I devices they must include a disclaimer stating that the test has not been approved or cleared by the FDA.

While the regulatory status of specific DTC genetic tests is unclear, and depends on the precise nature of the test and the service through which it is provided, at least one firm has adopted language consistent with Class I language. 23andMe, for instance, offers the following disclaimer:

The genotyping services of 23andMe are performed in LabCorp’s CLIA-certified laboratory. The tests have not been cleared or approved by the FDA but have been analytically validated according to CLIA standards. The information on this page is intended for research and educational purposes only, and is not for diagnostic use.

That does not mean that 23andMe necessarily considers itself to be providing a regulated medical device, and despite some diligent searching, I’ve been unable to locate a similar disclaimer on Pathway’s website (although my inability to locate such a disclaimer does not guarantee its absence). Pathway’s chief science officer, David Becker, did tell The Post today that it was the company’s understanding that “under the current regulation…this test does not have to have FDA approval per se…and we do not claim that is [sic] does.”

As is typical of the regulatory framework for genetic testing, the current regulatory status of DTC genetic tests remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that, at least for the moment and in most cases, regulatory oversight from the FDA is fairly minimal.

CLIA, Validity and Utility. The FDA’s reluctance to regulate LDTs, particularly of the DTC variety, does not mean that these tests go entirely unregulated. In addition to a variety of state regulations, there are other sources of federal regulatory authority.

The most well-known of these is the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, or CLIA, which is enforced by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). Labs that perform human testing, including genetic testing, are regulated through a CLIA certification process. For a lab to obtain CLIA certification, it must satisfy CMS requirements relating to quality control, personnel qualifications, records maintenance, and proficiency testing.

CLIA certification also requires the laboratory to demonstrate the analytical validity of its tests,⁶ although it makes no inquiry into tests’ clinical validity.⁷ That is, while CLIA certification addresses whether a lab’s tests perform consistently and control variation to the extent possible (analytical validity), there is no agency inquiry into the tests’ accuracy in detecting the presence of a given condition or phenotype or predicting the development of a disease (clinical validity). Nor does CLIA certification involve an assessment of the clinical utility of a test, an inquiry which involves comparing the benefits of a test to its associated costs and harms. Establishing the clinical utility of DTC genetic testing has been a source of particular contention.

For the moment, all reputable DTC genetic testing providers appear to be conducting their tests in CLIA certified environments. In practice, this works as follows: the consumer purchases a spit kit (either online or, as of this week, at the drugstore), fills it with saliva, then sends it to the DTC company for testing. The actual genetic testing may be performed directly by the company itself (Pathway, for example, operates its own CLIA facility), or by an outside genetic testing laboratory (23andMe, for example, outsources its testing to LabCorp, which operates its own CLIA facility).

The net result is that most DTC genetic tests are subject to some degree of regulation with respect to analytic validity. Unlike IVD kits, however, few if any DTC genetic tests are subject to federal regulatory oversight with respect to clinical validity or clinical utility.

Enforcement Discretion. When it comes to the FDA, LDTs and the regulation of DTC genetic testing, about the only thing that’s truly clear is that the FDA appears to have substantially more regulatory authority than it is currently exercising. Despite this authority, the FDA has, for several years now, utilized “enforcement discretion” with respect to the vast majority of LDTs.

Late last year, Don St. Pierre, deputy director of the FDA’s Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation and Safety, the same office Alberto Gutierrez now heads, described the agency’s thinking on LDTs in stark terms:

If a lab makes an LDT, then it is a medical device manufacturer. Just because you have a CLIA certificate does not mean you are not a medical device maker, and everything you do is under FDA enforcement discretion.

To put it another way, just because the FDA has been largely content to sit on the sidelines and watch the genetic testing industry proliferate, there is no guarantee that it will continue to do so.

And the FDA has certainly made regulatory overtures in the past. In July of 2007 the FDA published draft guidance (pdf) outlining its proposed regulatory approach to a specific type of LDT: in vitro diagnostic multivariate index assays (IVDMIAs). An IVDMIA is a device that:

(1) combines the values of multiple variables using an interpretation function to yield a single, patient-specific result (e.g. a “classification,” “score,” “index,” etc.) that is intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease, and

(2) provides a result whose derivation is non-transparent and cannot be independently derived or verified by the end user.

An example of an IVDMIA that has already been cleared by the FDA is MammaPrint, a test for predicting whether an existing cancer will metastasize in women with early-stage breast cancer.

Final IVDMIA regulations have not been issued, but in January another FDA official from the In Vitro Diagnostics office, Elizabeth Mansfield, told Turna Ray of GenomeWeb’s Pharmacogenomics Reporter that the “IVDMIA guidance is still on the table.” Added Mansfield, “We want to see what we need to do. Do we need to do anything? How much do we need to do? Who do we need to look at? Who don’t we need to look at?”

The Open Secret of DTC Medical Genetic Testing. Mansfield’s comments illustrate the uncertainty over whether any new FDA regulatory initiative will necessarily include the current set of DTC genetic tests, including all or some of those offered by Pathway Genomics, 23andMe and others.

The definition of IVDMIA proposed in the FDA’s draft guidance included those tests that are “…intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease….” If new regulations should arrive, will the definition look substantially the same? More importantly, will the FDA categorize any or all of the current DTC genetic tests as being intended for medical diagnosis, treatment or prevention?

Six months ago, in “The Open Secret of DTC Medical Genetic Testing,” I wrote that the continued expansion of DTC genetic testing services had strengthened the immediacy of the relationship between genetic testing and medical treatment decisions, which clearly relates to the FDA’s supervisory mandate under the FFDCA.⁸ Nothing in the past six months has changed that analysis. Indeed, it has become increasingly clear that many DTC genetic testing services are aimed at guiding clinical or medical decision-making, including the selection of therapeutics (e.g., pharmacogenetics testing) and the decision to reproduce (e.g., carrier screening).

For the moment, 23andMe, Pathway Genomics and other DTC genetic testing companies continue in their attempts to navigate a razor-thin divide between clinical and consumer personal genomics. The website materials for 23andMe’s “Health Edition” product, for instance, invite consumers to “take a more active role in managing your health” by learning of genetic risks for “various diseases and conditions [that] will allow you and your doctor to focus on the lifestyle changes and preventative steps that matter most for you.” 23andMe’s terms of service, however, tell a different story, in large boldface type:

23andMe Service Is For Research and Educational Use Only. We Do Not Provide Medical Advice, And The Services Cannot Be Used For Health Ascertainment or Disease Purposes.

Pathway Genomics presents a similar case. The description of Pathway’s Health Kit product promises consumers access to genetic information and guidance that will “allow you to modify your health regime so that you may live a healthier, longer life” and “empowers you and your doctor to make decisions that could save your life.” The terms of service, on the other hand, state that “Pathway Genomics and the Services do not provide medical advice or diagnosis or treatment recommendations for diseases or other health conditions.”

There may well be a narrow but real divide between the act of supplying consumers with genetic information of possible medical relevance and the act of providing direct medical advice and diagnoses. However, looking at the product materials offered by DTC genetic testing companies, it is increasingly difficult to believe that the average consumer – whether shopping online, or in line at Walgreens – will be capable of parsing such a fine distinction. When it comes to mapping the future of the personal genomics landscape, however, the more important question is whether that distinction will continue to hold water with regulatory agencies.

Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda. Last fall, when I wrote about The Open Secret of DTC Medical Genetic Testing, I took pains to note that the fact that these companies could be regulated by the FDA and other agencies, by extending the existing legal and regulatory framework, did not necessarily mean that they should or would be regulated.

As for the would, the statement from the FDA’s Gutierrez, that Pathway would be guilty of offering “an illegally marketed device if” it proceeds with its Walgreens partnership, is the clearest signal yet that the FDA may have decided it has been long enough on the sidelines. While that’s not a promise that the FDA will abandon its enforcement discretion, it is the strongest hint the FDA has given to date that it would be prepared to undertake direct regulatory action against a DTC genetic testing company.

One of the questions posed in Five Questions for Personal Genomics in 2010 was whether this would “be the year that the FDA, in coordination with CMS, finally tackles the approval and regulation of diagnostic tests through the development of a premarket approval process, a nationwide test registry or some other means?” We’re less than five months into 2010 and the NIH has already announced its plans for a nationwide genetic test registry. Now it appears that the next regulatory development may be the implementation of a more robust premarket approval process for genetic tests, including DTC genetic tests. Neither of these developments should come as complete surprises.

The response from both industry and regulators in the coming weeks and months will bear watching. My guess is that any new regulations will be implemented gradually, and may not impact all of the products offered by DTC companies, including Pathway and 23andMe.

When Pathway Genomics launched last summer, I applauded the company’s decision to separate its ancestry product from its other health and disease products by using separate customized SNP chips:

…Pathway’s launch reflects a new wrinkle in how the industry may attempt to respond to the anticipated regulation of clinical genetic testing. Differentiating its recreational and clinical products from the outset could be just the sort of subtle but significant decision that would allow Pathway to quickly adapt to any regulations that distinguish educational or recreational uses of genetic data (such as genealogy) from clinical or medical uses (such as disease, pharmacogenetics or carrier testing).

23andMe soon followed suit, and the strategy continues to strike me as a well-conceived one. It would not be a surprise to see the first wave of regulations distinguish between tests that return information of clinical significance and those that do not, with the latter continuing to be available directly to consumers with little or no premarket oversight.

Finally, there’s the lingering question of whether the FDA and other regulatory bodies should play a more active role in regulating the genetic testing marketplace, including DTC genetic test providers. Here is what I wrote six months ago:

As for the should, it’s still not clear that, even if they are offering medical genetic testing, companies such as 23andMe are posing a risk to either consumer or patient safety that requires increased regulatory activity. Policy considerations such as the legitimate interest of individuals in obtaining direct access to their genetic information and a desire to foster the growth of an emerging commercial field to speed the development of technology as well as consumer awareness of the benefits of genetic testing are balanced against sincere concerns by clinicians that their patients may be misled or harmed by inaccurate or incomplete genetic information. The scale does not appear to have tipped definitively in either direction.

It will be fascinating to see if Pathway’s partnership with Walgreens, seemingly a stroke of clever product positioning, turns out to be a tipping point in the regulation of personal genomics, particularly DTC genetic tests. The Pathway/Walgreens announcement has not actually increased the availability of DTC genetic tests. They will still be available to any individual (other than to residents of New York State, which requires a separate laboratory license that Pathway has not obtained) with an internet connection, functioning salivary glands and some disposable income.

What has changed is their visibility. It is just possible that one of the safest strategies for avoiding regulation – out-of-sight, out-of-mind – played a significant role in the regulation (or lack thereof) of DTC genetic testing. Tests once predominantly available only to early adopters capable of seeking them out online will now begin to appear on the shelves of thousands of neighborhood drugstores nationwide. To a greater degree than ever before, genetic testing will soon be available to mainstream America (and subject to the impulse buy). And that, for better or for worse, may be all that it takes to convince some regulators that the time for action is finally at hand.

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¹ 62 Fed. Reg. 62, 249 (Nov. 21, 1997) (“FDA believes that laboratories developing [in-house] tests are acting as manufacturers of medical devices and are subject to FDA jurisdiction under the Act.”).

² 21 U.S.C. § 379a (“In any action to enforce the requirements of this chapter respecting a device, food, drug, or cosmetic the connection with interstate commerce required for jurisdiction in such action shall be presumed to exist.”)

³ An in vitro diagnostic test kit is generally understood in the industry to be an in vitro diagnostic product, as set forth in 21 C.F.R. § 809.3 which defines in vitro diagnostic devices as “those reagents, instruments, and systems intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, including a determination of the state of health, in order to cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent disease or its sequelae. Such products are intended for use in the collection, preparation, and examination of specimens taken from the human body.”Although the word “kit” has no specific regulatory definition, its meaning is generally understood by the FDA and the industry. See e.g., FDA, Guidance on Pharmacogenetic Tests and Genetic Tests for Heritable Markers (June 19, 2007) (use of the word “kit” in agency guidance).

⁴ See 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(d)(1) (explaining the circumstances under which FDA considers a device safe); 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(2) (explaining the circumstances under which FDA considers a device effective).

⁵ See 21 C.F.R. § 864.40209(a). ASRs are “antibodies, both polyclonal and monoclonal, specific receptor proteins, ligands, nucleic acid sequences, and similar reagents which, through specific binding or chemical reaction with substances in a specimen, are intended for use in a diagnostic application for identification and quantification of an individual chemical substance or ligand in biological specimens.”

⁶ As discussed in the SACGHS report, and elsewhere, CLIA has established specific requirements for certain areas of testing, including microbiology and cytogenetics. CMS has not established a specialty under CLIA for genetic testing, despite several past recommendations that it do so (although the SACHGS report did not echo this recommendation).

⁷ Gail H. Javitt, In Search of a Coherent Framework: Options for FDA Oversight of Genetic Tests, 62 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 617, 639 (2007).

⁸ The FDA’s mandate includes protecting the public by ensuring that “there is a reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of devices intended for human use.” 21 U.S.C. 393(b)(2)(C).